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Introduction
Residential zoning rules have significant effects on the number
and type of homes and the distribution of wealth in America. Zon-
ing rules affect the supply of housing by telling developers where
and how they can build. Zoning rules distribute wealth in two
ways. They distribute good and bad neighborhoods by setting con-
ditions on the free movement of people. They distribute cash by
subsidizing the housing purchases of some groups and taxing the
housing purchases of others.
Like any system of rules affecting market activity, zoning rules
can be efficient (meaning that no other set of rules would make
everybody better off)' or inefficient, fair or unfair, consistent with
our political values or not. Today in America, a shortage of afford-
able housing and a growing disparity in the incomes of the rich and
the poor can be attributed, in part, to our system of residential zon-
ing.2 In many communities, zoning rules create favored enclaves of
1. In law and economics terms, resources are said to be used efficiently when
they are employed at their highest value. When economists speak of efficiency, they
sometimes refer to "Pareto superiority," a relatively uncontroversial, albeit limited,
definition which confines the use of the term to voluntary transactions in which at
least one person is made better off and no one else is made worse off. In the real
world, however, the requisite conditions for Pareto-superior transactions are seldom
satisfied because transactions are often involuntary and often adversely affect third
parties. Therefore, economists frequently use a less austere concept of efficiency,
known as "wealth maximization" or "Kaldor-Hicks efficiency" when discussing poli-
cies or markets. This latter concept of efficiency, sometimes called "potential Pareto
superiority," is one in which economic winners could potentially compensate eco-
nomic losers, regardless of whether they actually do so. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11-16 (4th ed. 1992).
2. This paper focuses exclusively on the economic effects of zoning. For excellent
discussions of zoning and race, see Richard T. Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political
Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1843 (1994) (describing how polit-
ical boundaries perpetuate racial division) and DOUrLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A.
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low density homes benefitting from deep purchase-subsidies, sepa-
rate tax bases and cartel-like control over membership. These
same rules confine affordable housing to a narrow set of left-over
spaces: areas of the central city marked by crime, unemployment,
landlord abandonment, physical deterioration, depressed property
values, a shrinking tax base, and-paradoxically-high rent.'
To the same extent that current zoning rules slow the construc-
tion of affordable homes and exacerbate income segregation, zon-
ing reform could speed the former and lessen the latter. One set of
proposals is inclusionary zoning: the revision of residential zoning
rules to encourage (or sometimes compel) the profitable construc-
tion of affordable housing in places where it otherwise would not
be built. Law and economics literature has consistently resisted
this proposal. Its resistance is based almost entirely on Robert El-
lickson's article, The Irony of "Inclusionary Zoning".5 According
to Ellickson, inclusionary zoning brings a windfall to the few lucky
tenants awarded cheap homes. In the long run, however, it stalls
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDER-
CLASS (1993).
3. In fact, exclusionary zoning rules subsidize the construction and purchase of
better homes in particular suburban areas. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS
FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985); MARK I. GEL-
FAND, A NATION OF CITIES: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN AMERICA,
1933-1965 (1975).
4. See James J. Hartnett, Note, Affordable Housing, Exclusionary Zoning, and
American Apartheid: Using Title VIII to Foster Statewide Racial Integration, 68 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 89 (1993) (observing that "a major cause of many of the ills afflicting Ameri-
can ghettos has not received sufficient attention from the media or the public-at-
large-the systematic exclusion of low-income and minority people from most subur-
ban communities across the country"); William J. Wilson, Studying Inner-City Social
Dislocations: The Challenge of Public Agenda Research, 56 AM. Soc. REV. 1, 9-11
(1991) (discussing the adverse impacts on the inner-city labor force of the concentra-
tion of poverty in certain urban neighborhoods). The pressure on low-income hous-
ing prices has been mitigated in America historically by the sheer abundance of land.
However, there are limits to this abundance. One limit is the need for the urban poor
(taken as a group) to live near jobs and infrastructure. A second limit is the increas-
ing effort to stem suburban sprawl by restricting settlement patterns on the perimeters
of cities. See Edward J. Sullivan, Oregon Blazes a Trail, in STATE AND REGIONAL
COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING: IMPLEMENTING NEW METHODS FOR GROWTH MANAGE-
MENT 51 (Peter A. Buchsbaum & Larry J. Smith eds., 1993) (describing the growth
management plans of Oregon, which have been in place since the 1970s); William K.
Stevens; Disputed Conservation Plan Could Be Model for Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
16, 1997, § 1, at 18 (describing recent environmental growth management plan for San
Diego). A third limit is the magnitude of suburban sprawl, which results in a zoned
scarcity of developable land several miles from the centers of many cities.
5. 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167 (1981) [hereinafter Irony], also reprinted in RESOLV-
ING THE HOUSING CRISES: GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 135-176
(M. Bruce Johnson ed., 1982).
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the housing market, raises prices, decreases supply, and eventually
hurts the class of less wealthy people it originally intended to help.6
Citations to Ellickson for the proposition that inclusionary zoning
7rules hurt the poor are legion.
6. See id. at 1170 ("The irony of inclusionary zoning is thus that, in the places
where it has proven most likely to be adopted, its net effects are apt to be the opposite
of the ones advertised.").
7. See, e.g., WILLIAM TUCKER, ZONING, RENT CONTROL AND AFFORDABLE
HOUSING 11-14 (1991) (inclusionary zoning leads to housing shortages and homeless-
ness); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY
RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 327-29 (1985) (inclusionary
zoning is a tool of rich suburbanites who want to stop growth); Jane E. Larson, Free
Markets Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L.J. 179, 181 (1995) (inclusionary land
use rules slow the construction of affordable housing); Quintin Johnstone, Govern-
ment Control of Urban Land Use: A Comparative Major Program Analysis, 39 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 373 (1994) (inclusionary rules restrict supply of affordable homes); Wil-
liam Merrill & Robert Lincoln, Linkage, Fees and Fair Share Regulations: Law and
Method, 25 URB. LAW. 223, 280 n.296 (1993) ("low- and moderate- income families
benefit adequately from the operation of the market in providing higher income hous-
ing"); Lawrence Berger, Inclusionary Zoning Devices as Takings: The Legacy of the
Mt. Laurel Cases, 70 NEB. L. REV. 186, 187 n.1 (1991) ("the market's allocation of
where people live may be the most 'efficient' . . . [and] it probably is the allocation
desired by most of our citizenry"); Jane E. Schukoske, Housing Linkage: Regulating
Development Impact on Housing Costs, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1018 n.40 & 1024
nn.73-75 (1991) (explaining inclusionary zoning through reference to Ellickson);
Carol H. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Taking Jurispru-
dence-An Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577, 588 n.49 (1990) (inclusion-
ary zoning risks increasing the price of affordable housing); Bernard H. Siegan,
Conserving and Developing the Land, 27 SAN. DIEGO L. REV. 279, 293 n.31 (1990)
(inclusionary zoning decreases the supply of housing 'because developer revenues
fall); Philip P. Houle, Eminent Domain, Police Power, and Business Regulation: Eco-
nomic Liberty and the Constitution, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 51, 73 n.76 (1989) (inclusionary
.zoning has "harmful long-term effects on maintaining an adequate stock of low-in-
come housing"); Matthew L. Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism and Rational Choice Polit-
ical Economy: A Critique of Capture Theory, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1317 n.103(1988) ("[I]nclusionary zoning produces many of the same effects [as growth con-
trols], but is wrapped in a more palatable ideological ribbon."); Carol M. Rose, Plan-
ning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71
CAL. L. REV. 837, 898 (1983) (inclusionary regulations raise the cost of housing); John
J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for Taking Issues, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 489 (1983) (inclusionary zoning causes a decline in supply of
affordable housing because builders'. revenue falls).
Public policy literature does contain at least a mild dissent. See, e.g., ALAN MAL-
LACH, INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS: POLICIES AND PRACTICES 91 (1984) (de-
velopers profit from some inclusionary zoning regimes where, to the extent that a
municipality offers concessions, these concessions redirect costs away from the devel-
oper). Ellickson's analysis is also rejected by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Holmdel Builders Assoc. v. Township of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 294 (N.J. 1990) (in-
clusionary zoning not analogous to a "tax" despite burden on developer, since benefi-
cial economic consequences may be enough to counteract direct economic losses
associated with forced construction of inclusionary units). As seen below, however,
even these authors concede too much.
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Since the publication of Irony in 1981, even proponents of inclu-
sionary zoning have deferred to Ellickson on matters of econom-
ics. 8 Inclusionary zoning has become a proposal for social, rather
than economic, reform, supported by normative claims for fairness
and racial justice.9 This pattern of argument is familiar and disas-
trous for the would-be reformer. When a proposed reform is at-
tacked by law and economics commentators for departing from
theoretical efficiency, the reformer can win an argument by divert-
ing attention away from efficiency and towards another, more im-
portant end. However, when a proposed reform is attacked as
hurting the very people it intends to help, the standard reply does
not work. The legal economist defending the system in such a
manner appears as compassionate as the reformer. The reformer,
unless he retreats to attacking the assumptions of economics as a
discipline, can only refute this stronger type of claim by doing bet-
ter economics than the economist. In the case of inclusionary zon-
ing, no such refutation has been attempted; and the widespread use
of inclusionary zoning remains, for most people who think about it
on a theoretical level, an uncompelling idea.
What makes the current situation interesting to me is that Ellick-
son-and the discipline that has cited him since 1981-appears to
be wrong as a matter of contemporary economic theory. Market
forces operating under inclusionary zoning rules should create
more affordable housing than market forces operating under the
rules applicable in most American regions now. In fact, a switch to
inclusionary zoning rules is likely to expand the aggregate supply
of housing available across income strata, while leaving regional
housing markets no less (and possibly more) "efficient" than they
are today.10 This Article sets out a surprisingly traditional
8. See Harold A. McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation in Exclusionary Zon-
ing Law, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 641 n.112 (1987) (the benefits of inclusion-
ary zoning "sometimes flow to moderate-income rather than lower-income people");
Timothy J. Choppin, Note, Breaking the Exclusionary Land Use Regulation Barrier:
Policies to Promote Affordable Housing in the Suburbs, 82 GEo. L.J. 2039, 2062-63
(1994) (inclusionary programs are "ironic" because they coerce builders into paying
for affordable housing).
9. However, economic rhetoric in favor of limited reform may be on the rise
thanks to then-U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Jack Kemp, ex-
New Jersey Governor Thomas H. Kean, and the ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REGULA-
TORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING, "NOT IN My BACK YARD": REMOVING
BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING (1991) [hereinafter "NIMBY" REPORT] (re-
scission of exclusionary rules makes the housing market work better).
10. Actually, the efficiency gain and the distributive effect are largely independ-
ent. As discussed below, the efficiency gain results from the removal of zoning rules
which even economists who have sworn to ignore distributive analysis for the remain-
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microeconomic justification for these claims. Part I briefly de-
scribes how and why residential communities zone, and outlines
some analytic frameworks used to distinguish "legitimate" from
"exclusionary" zoning. Part II provides an overdue critique of El-
lickson's article on inclusionary zoning, and identifies some now-
ubiquitous missteps. Part III, the heart of the Article, evaluates
the likely economic consequences of three ideal-typical inclusion-
ary zoning regimes. Throughout, economic concepts such as posi-
tive and negative externalities, cartel rent, stock capacity, price
discrimination, and market segmentation suggest that, notwith-
standing the prevailing theoretical view to the contrary, inclusion-
ary zoning has tremendous potential for increasing the aggregate
supply of affordable housing and augmenting the buying power of
the American poor.
I. Residential Zoning: Theoretical and Economic Baselines
A. The Consequences of Local Power
About ninety-seven percent of incorporated communities zone."
The power to zone is a grant from the state, and state legislatures
can revoke or condition it.12 The need to protect the environment
has caused some state legislatures to restrict local authority,13 but
concerns about the supply of housing have not. 4 Similarly, courts
der of their professional lives are likely to consider harmful. These rules forbid mar-
ket transactions to build affordable housing in areas where such construction would
be highly profitable to developers and landowners. The distribution of wealth to the
poor is somewhat parasitic on this efficiency (and revenue) gain produced by the gen-
eral retreat to less burdensome restrictions.
11. See CHARLES M. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 185 (1977) (some 9,000 cities
with a population of more than 5,000 zone).
12. See Joel Kosman, Toward an Inclusionary Jurisprudence: A Reconceptualiza-
tion of Zoning, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 98 (1993) (early enactment of zoning ordi-
nance is constitutionally legitimate tool to avoid certain conditions); David E. Hess,
Institutionalizing the Revolution: Judicial Reaction to State Land-Use Laws, 9 URB.
LAW. 183 (1977) (no state constitutional problems). But cf Berger, supra note 7, at
225 (specific owners have a federal Takings claim in cases where bonuses offered by a
city do not fairly compensate losses incurred in the sale of affordable houses).
13. See FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND
USE CONTROL (1971); James H. Wickersham, Note, The Quiet Revolution Continues:
The Emerging New Model for State Growth Management Statutes, 18 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 489 (1994).
14. In fact, state land use laws in Oregon and Washington have long required local
governments to zone for high-density use according to regional needs. See OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 197.005-.860 (1993) (Comprehensive Land Use Planning Coordination);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.110 (West 1991); Sullivan, supra note 4, at 51.
Three other states, New Jersey, Florida, and Rhode Island recently passed laws re-
quiring local governments to comply with affordable housing needs. See Note, State-
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can strike residential zoning rules that are beyond the police power
of local government.15 With a few famous exceptions, however,
courts have refused to review rules that restrict the supply of af-
fordable housing.16 As a result, local authorities today have very
broad powers to proscribe residential uses within their
jurisdictions. 17
Sponsored Growth Management as a Remedy for Exclusionary Zoning, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1127, 1136-42 (1995) [hereinafter Growth Management]. Other states "en-
courage" localities to follow regional plans, but provide no means to enforce compli-
ance. See OFF. OF POL'Y DEV. AND RES., U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URB. DEV.,
REMOVING REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING: How STATES AND
LOCALITIES ARE MOVING AHEAD 7-14, 19-22, 33-42 (1993) [hereinafter MOVING
AHEAD].
15. The landmark zoning case is Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U:S.
365 (1926). In Euclid, however, the Supreme Court refused to strike down a compre-
hensive zoning plan which banned commercial activities from residential areas.
Although the plan effectively deprived the plaintiff landowner of the freedom to use
its land for any purpose it might wish, the Court ruled that the zoning ordinance could
be a legitimate exercise of municipal police power, provided it was not "clearly arbi-
trary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare." Id. at 395. Subsequent cases have allowed localities the
specific prerogative to create exclusive residential districts, consistent with the
Supreme Court's acknowledgment, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9
(1974), that local government police power can be so ample as to lay out "zones
where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people." Thus, the burden on municipalities to justify
their zoning ordinances is minimal. See, e.g., Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jeho-
vah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 308 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding
no violation of the Due Process Clause in the creation of exclusive residential districts
to control traffic congestion and off-street parking in secluded residential areas);
Bossier City Medical Suite, Inc. v. City of Bossier, 483 F. Supp. 633, 650 (W.D. La.
1980) (finding a reasonable exercise of municipal zoning authority and no overt dis-
criminatory action in regulating the location of an abortion clinic). But see Colorado
Manufactured Hous. Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 946 F. Supp. 1539 (D. Colo.
1996) (invalidating, on preemption grounds, a municipal ordinance which required
manufactured housing to comply with local building standards, where such standards
conflicted with federal standards set forth in the National Manufactured Housing
Construction and Safety Standards Act). Although the local ordinance was not a land
use ordinance, per se, the court's ruling has obvious implications with respect to the
creation of more affordable housing).
16. See Growth Management, supra note 14, at 1131-32 (few state courts have
struck down local zoning rules; none but New Jersey has provided a decent remedy);
Choppin, supra note 8, at 2039 n.5 (federal equal protections claims rejected); Patricia
E. Salkin & John M. Armentano, The Fair Housing Act, Zoning and Affordable Hous-
ing, 25 URn. LAW. 893 (1993) (federal statutory claims tough to prove); Warth v. Sel-
din, 422 U.S. 490, 502-17 (1975) (standing barriers).
17. There are many proposals for reform. See, e.g., "NIMBY" REPORT, supra
note 9, at 9 (states should condition local zoning power on use of that power to re-
move regulatory barriers to the construction of affordable housing); John Charles Bo-
ger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A Fair Share Proposal for the Next
Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1573 (1993) (the federal tax code should strip mort-
gage interest and property tax deductions from homeowners in communities with ex-
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Local authorities use these broad powers to serve the interests of
their voters.18 In the suburban municipalities that ring most Amer-
ican cities, self-interest leads communities to restrict high-density
land uses and affordable housing. There are many motives. New
construction may compete with and decrease the resale value of
existing homes. New residents with incomes below the commu-
nity's average may lower the per capita tax base and therefore in-
crease the tax rate necessary for maintaining a given level of public
services. New residents, especially those with children, may1.re-
quire a higher level of services, also increasing the tax rate. The
zoning authority may dislike persons of a certain race or class. The
zoning authority, itself perfectly open-minded, may think that the
community dislikes persons of a certain race or class. Current resi-
dents, for their part, may fear crime, drugs, an expansion of the
urban ghetto, and a gradual loss of political control. They may also
worry about the character, aesthetics, or traditions of their space,
or they may simply prefer low density and the quasi-Arcadian style
of suburban life.
The economic effects of exclusionary residential zoning rules can
be divided into five rough categories. First, the rules increase the
average price of housing-new and used-by making suburban
construction more expensive. 19 Second, the rules increase the price
of multi-family housing relative to single-family housing.2" This
clusionary zoning); Choppin, supra note 8, at 2057 & n.5 (federal agencies and judges
should enforce'existing legal policies); Hartnett, supra note 4 (proposing that courts
be more receptive to federal Fair Housing Act anti-discrimination suits challenging
local zoning rules).
18. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 389
(1977) [hereinafter Growth Controls] ("[Sluburban homeowners (if unconstrained)
will behave like a profit-maximizing cartel."); DUANE WINDSOR, FISCAL ZONING IN
SUBURBAN COMMUNITIES 152-53 (1979) (communities practice "fiscal mercantilism").
But see FiSCHEL, supra note 7, at 71-73 (development interests sometimes influence
local authorities to act against the interests of their constituency).
19. "NIMBY" REPORT, supra note 9, at 4, found that "[a]n increase of 25 to 30
percent in housing prices attributable to excessive regulation is not uncommon." That
number may be extreme. See FiSCHEL, supra note 7, at 239; David E. Dowall, The
Effect of Land Use and Environmental Regulations on Housing Costs, 8 POL. STUD. J.
277 (1979); STEPHEN R. SEIDEL, HOUSING COSTS & GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
159-86 (1978). On the other hand, few studies reflect the power of the suburban mu-
nicipality to impose ad hoc requirements on particular development proposals. See
Panel Discussion: Redistribution and Regulation of Housing, 32 EMORY L.J. 767, 800-
01 (1983) (moderated and edited by William A. Fischel).
20. The amount of affordable multi-family housing stock declined from 8.6 million
units in 1974 to 6 million units in 1989. Multifamily Housing Finance and Production:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Dev. of the House Comm.
on Banking, Finance and Urb. Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1992) (statement of
William C. Perkins, Board of Directors, Fed. Housing Fin. Board).
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price change results from a subsidy to single-family housing buyers:
because the zoning authority forbids competing uses, single-family
housing buyers face a more abundant supply than they otherwise
might.21  This subsidy is paid for by people who buy multi-family
housing, profitable sites for which are artificially scarce. 2 Third,
exclusionary zoning forces people to consume land and improve-
ments they do not want. This forced consumption is inefficient be-
cause the recipient could sell the extra land and improvements on
the market for more than what they are worth to the recipient per-
sonally.3 Such forced consumption is also inefficient if it stops
producers from substituting cheaper factors of production (such as
technology and design) for land. 4 Fourth, such zoning segregates
the tax base into wealthy suburban and poor urban components,
creating a greater disparity between property tax rates and the re-
turn in public services per tax dollar paid.25 Finally, the rules en-
21. Zoning is only one of many subsidies to wealthy and middle-income suburban
home buyers-the beneficiaries of significant, federal redistribution. Neither federal
nor state governments tax as income the non-rent that homeowners pay themselves.
Nor does the federal government tax most income used to pay interest on mortgage
payments, even for second homes. People who sell their homes for a profit can often
avoid the capital gains tax, which makes home ownership an artificially good invest-
ment during inflationary periods. Government provides mortgage insurance. Federal
and state governments pay for highway and road construction out of general tax reve-
nues. Residents of incorporated suburbs do not have to pay taxes to support public
services in the central city. See generally Richard F. Muth, Redistribution of Income
Through Regulation in Housing, 32 EMORY L.J. 691 (1983).
22. The number of multi-family housing starts in 1992 was lower than at any time
since the 1950s. Multifamily Housing Finance and Production, supra note 20, at 35
(the 174,000 multi-family housing starts were only 4,000 more than the 170,000 mobile
home starts). The biggest purchaser of high-density land is the federal government in
its programs to house the poor. Recognizing the increased costs associated with the
zoned shortage of multi-family development sites, HUD fought for and eventually
won the right to condition grants of housing assistance to state and local governments
on the existence of a satisfactory plan for the reduction of regulatory barriers to af-
fordable housing. (Prior to 1992, HUD was barred by federal law from taking zoning
law into account in dispersal decisions.) See "NIMBY" REPORT, supra note 9, at 10.
23. Such a result fails the Kaldor-Hicks test for efficiency-the asset would be
valued higher if it were in other hands. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 13-16 (4th ed.
1992).
24. This is allocative inefficiency-the same amount of "housing" could be pro-
duced with fewer resources.
25. The long run effects of income segregation may be devastating to the basic
infrastructure of poorer neighborhoods. Considerable discussion on this point centers
around the arguments set forth in Note, Equalization of Municipal Services: The Eco-
nomics of Serrano and Shaw, 82 YALE L.J. 89 (1972). On the other hand, some differ-
entiation between expenditure levels may allow consumers to choose the level of
public services they desire most. See infra Part I.B. and accompanying notes (discuss-
ing the theories of Charles Tiebout).
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courage the concentration of poverty.26  Concentration is
economically significant if, as some argue, it creates destructive
"feedback" effects such as abandonment cycles,27 landlord milk-
ing,28 speculative disinvestment, 29 and "red-lining. '30
B. Is Exclusionary Zoning Efficient?
An influential theory, attributed to Charles Tiebout, says that all
these economic effects are the efficient consequences of bargaining
between individuals and local governments. 31 According to the
Tiebout hypothesis, the exclusive character of a neighborhood is a
good allocated to the highest bidder. The bid of each potential res-
ident, however, is adjusted by the positive or negative externalities
caused by including the person in the community. 32 For example,
traditional zoning rules will give a parcel to a wealthy resident who
will pay $60,000, rather than several poorer residents who will pay
$100,000, if the inclusion of the poorer residents would cause
$40,001 or more in harm (e.g., lost local character, tax base, or
property value). In a perfect world, a community would bargain
individually with each potential resident. In the real world, how-
26. See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERI-
CAN (1994).
27. See Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural
Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 699, 797-810 (1993) (describing self-perpetuating cycles of falling expectations).
28. See Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low In-
come Housing: "Milking" and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 485, 489-97(1986) (sometimes the rational landlord will "milk" a building rather than maintain
it).
29. See Ford, supra note 2, at 1849-60 (describing the racial components of invest-
ment decisions).
30. See "NIMBY" REPORT, supra note 9, at 3-12 to 3-13 (the economic effects of
redlining); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 50-53 (describing redlining's "dy-
namic" causes).
31. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956). For a more favorable treatment than mine, see generally Bruce Hamilton,
Property Taxes and the Tiebout Hypothesis: Some Empirical Evidence, in FISCAL ZON-
ING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 13 (Edwin Mills & Wallace Oates eds., 1975); FIS-
CHEL, supra note 7, at 293-315.
32. The classic definition of "externalities" is by A.C. Pigou (c. 1920): "[O]ne per-
son A, in the course of rendering some service, for which payment is made, to a
second person B, incidentally also renders services or disservices to other persons...
of such a sort that payment cannot be extracted from the benefitted parties or com-
pensation enforced on behalf of the injured parties." See Jacques LeBoeuf, The Eco-
nomics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 555, 567 (1994) (quoting Pigou). Or, in LeBoeuf's own words: "Exter-
nalities exist whenever the private costs or benefits of an activity do not correspond to
the social costs or benefits." Id.
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ever, transaction costs prohibit this approach, and the community
passes general zoning rules. Absent market failure, the rules re-
main more or less efficient. If for any reason they do not reflect
real benefits and costs, the local zoning authority will change the
regime accordingly.
Tiebout developed his theory as a partial answer to the public
goods problem associated with provision of government services. 3
In that regard, the theory offers useful insights into how specializa-
tion by communities may benefit housing consumers.34 Problems
arise, however, when one uses the Tiebout theory to justify local
rules about the construction of affordable housing (something Tie-
bout himself never did). Indeed, a number of factors operate to
ensure that a local zoning authority-unless it fails to serve the ra-
tional interests of its constituency-will consistently forbid efficient
purchases.
The greatest failure of the Tiebout model, which charges new
entrants the costs the community incurs on their behalf, is that a
large portion of these costs simply do not exist from a regional per-
spective. For example, if new residents of a community are less
wealthy than their predecessors, the tax rate necessary to fund a
given amount of public services per community resident in-
creases.35 The increase is especially significant if the new residents
as a group require disproportionate public spending (e.g., they
have more children in public school). Faced with the need to raise
the tax rate or lower public service expenditures per person, a ra-
tional community will make such low-income residents (or the de-
veloper) carry these costs, or, if the costs are too high (or no
effective method exists for extracting payment from the new resi-
dents or the developer), exclude such residents altogether. The
Tiebout model applauds either response as an efficient bulwark
against negative externalities. But, from a regional perspective,
none of these externalities exist. Any change in the community's
tax base will be offset by an equal and opposite change in another
community's tax base. And any increase in the number of children
in the community's public schools will be offset by an equal an op-
posite decrease in school enrollment somewhere else. Zoning rules
33. FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 293-94.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 103-105.
35. The new residents use an equal amount of services per person but do not make
an equal contribution to the tax base. Because municipal expenditures in America
are most often funded by property taxes, the relative aspect of "wealth" is the as-
sessed value of the resident's home.
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do not create or destroy people, they just change the willingness
and ability of people to move around.
The Tiebout model is also marred by other costs that the local
zoning authorities charge to the account of new residents and de-
velopers. A rational community in which many people would like
to live (to the extent other communities that are equally attractive
and less restrictively zoned are not available to purchasers), will
limit new construction in order to profit from the scarcity of
homes. Restricting supply can increase the willingness of buyers of
new construction to pay high exaction fees or development fees
(essentially a bribe disbursed to existing community members).
Equally important, restricting supply can increase the resale value
of existing residents' homes. In either case, the resulting price in-
crease to new residents and developers is economic rent in the clas-
sic sense of a manufacturer's cartel. The Tiebout model treats any
decrease in the cartel rents the community receives as a cost for
which the community deserves compensation from the cartel's
victims.
There are two additional false costs that may raise entry barriers
above an efficient level. First, a community may choose its zoning
rules based on arbitrary expectations and irrational fears about po-
tential residents. These worries are not true costs of inclusion if
they are based on attitudes that will change once inclusion occurs.
Second, a community may favor race-neutral zoning rules because
they exclude (in an acceptable manner) certain races. The Tiebout
model protects all such discriminatory preferences and makes mi-
nority residents who would like to move into a community pay for
that community's racism.36
Finally, the Tiebout model fails to include benefits that may re-
sult from the transactions that residential zoning rules forbid. De-
.velopers and the owners of vacant land in a jurisdiction stand to
make a considerable profit from the construction of homes at
higher density than the jurisdiction would otherwise allow (if they
did not, there would be no need for the zoning rule). These devel-
opers and landowners are either nonresidents (with no political
voice) or a minority whose interests conflict with those of the polit-
ically dominant class. In addition, no one in the local jurisdiction
benefits from regional improvements, such as a lower concentra-
tion of poverty and less urban overcrowding.
36. Strictly speaking, the "cost" of racial integration is a true externality (unlike
the others discussed) in that it does permanently decrease someone's welfare.
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C. Separating Good Zoning from Bad: The Search for a
Definition of "Exclusionary"
For all of these reasons, commentators agree that some local
zoning rules lead to inefficiency and artificially high housing costs.
Neither economics nor law and economics, however, has been able
to propose a workable definition of exactly which rules are im-
proper-i.e., "exclusionary"-and which are not. Bickering over
where to draw the line has hindered the discussion of inclusionary
zoning as a viable alternative to existing rules.
1. Distinguishing by Motive
Some critics of zoning, mostly lawyers, try to distinguish legiti-
mate from exclusionary zoning on the basis of the residents' moti-
vations.37 A plan designed to harmonize uses and remove
externalities is legitimate and presumably efficient. A plan
designed to exclude others on the basis of income is illegitimate
and potentially harmful. This approach is problematic. A local ju-
risdiction will give the same Euclid reasons for its rules regardless
of its actual motivation.38 Economic analysis of the community
might reveal whose interests lie where, but this analysis is difficult
in the individual case and provides sketchy evidence of intent.
More importantly, as shown below, a program of inclusionary zon-
ing can harness and use many of the illegitimate motivations of
local landowners. Bad motives, as much as good ones, can propel a
helpful intervention.
37. See, e.g., Salkin & Armentano, supra note 16.
38. In Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1924), the
court invalidated a local zoning ordinance, after finding that it had the effect of classi-
fying and segregating population on the basis of income. The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed, thereby validating de facto segregation. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Court in
Euclid did suggest, in dicta, that zoning ordinances could be challenged successfully
when "concretely applied to particular premises ... or to particular conditions . .. ."
Id. at 395. The Court's Euclid decision, however, still allows local governments to cite
to their police powers as justification for the creation of exclusionary zoning rules.
For a particularly egregious example of exclusionary sentiment as reflected in a
non-residential zoning debate, see Karen DeWitt, "Cold Shoulder to Churches that
Practice Preachings," N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27 1994, at Al (D.C. zoning officials seeking
to shut down church breakfast program initially asserted a compelling governmental
interest in excluding the homeless from a "neighborhood of Government offices and
expensive apartments," but later abandoned this argument for socio-economic
apartheid). See also Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment,
862 F. Supp. 538, 545 (D.D.C. 1994).
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2. Distinguishing by Economic Effects
Another way to distinguish exclusionary zoning is to look at
quantifiable economic effects. At least one commentator proposes
land value as a proxy for efficiency. 39 If a zoning rule creates bene-
fits in excess of its costs, land values should rise.4° This approach is
promising, but the cost and benefits of a rule change are not en-
tirely represented in the price of land. Land value does not track
the beneficial, long-term effects that arise from the integration of
different incomes. Nor does land value in a jurisdiction indicate
benefits or costs imposed on persons who live or are shopping for
homes elsewhere.
Other studies simply note how zoning rules affect housing starts
or mean housing prices.4' Such studies are useful in quantifying
the effect of zoning restrictions, but they do not tell whether a
given price or quantity effect is justified by positive externalities.
Clearly, once a certain point is reached, more housing starts cannot
always be good.42
3. Distinguishing "Normal" Uses
Another proposal would allow zoning rules as long as they are
"normal" to a jurisdiction. This approach, advocated by some con-
servative commentators,43 has two advantages. First, it relies on
existing Takings jurisprudence as a starting point; this allows judges
to approach the problem in a familiar manner. Second, judges can
decide the question of "normalcy" fairly easily, and without refer-
ence to economics. Third, the approach is deferential-consistent
with Tiebout's theory that income segregation is efficient because
local governments should "specialize," 41 and with the Chicago
School's assumption that the existing property rules are presump-
tively the best.45
39. See FiSCHEL, supra note 7, at 241-43.
40. Id.
41. See generally supra note 17.
42. Furthermore, the selection of one measure of economic performance from
among many disputed possibilities is essentially arbitrary-and depends more on the
economic culture of the arbiter than on any matter of logic. Viewed most skeptically,
one who favors price as the indicator of "exclusionary" has already discounted legiti-
mate zoning rules, which can create value. On the other hand, one who favors hous-
ing starts ignores qualitative differences between types of housing built.
43. See, e.g., Growth Controls, supra note 18 (recommending Takings actions when
a zoning rule is not "normal" for the jurisdiction).
44. See generally supra note 31.
45. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 1, at 23 (observing that current common law is
the cumulation of centuries of "inarticulate gropings toward efficiency").
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However, if a community's zoning choices are flawed by cartel
rent, prejudice, and a community's inability to make or take pay-
ments for regional externalities, then it makes little sense to defer
to such choices simply because a community consistently uses them
to exclude all prospective low income residents. Similarly, defer-
ence to common law property rules, developed by impartial judges,
is a poor defense of laws made by a local participatory polity.4 6 If
these two distinctions are not reason enough, the normalcy defini-
tion of "exclusionary" can also be rejected simply because it cannot
result in meaningful reform. Communities that are already exclu-
sionary will remain so, and communities that are not exclusionary
will be forced to house increasing numbers of the poor. If inquiry
proves that this is the best possible situation, so be it. But to set
the definition of proper zoning at normalcy before analyzing alter-
natives makes little methodological sense.47
4. Not Distinguishing
Luckily, one can determine the efficacy of an inclusionary zoning
program without developing a comprehensive system to differenti-
ate "exclusionary" and "legitimate" rules. Inclusionary programs
come with their own agenda: build more homes at lower prices,
and make these homes available to a wider income class of people.
The interesting question is not how the inclusionary program fits
some theoretical model, but whether the program can accomplish
its aims, and what the various effects of the program-on supply,
price, and basic efficiency-will be. Most modern work on the eco-
nomics of zoning follows this pragmatic approach, regardless of the
side of the political spectrum from which it appears.48 A renewed
46. The "Chicago School" typically gives legislative rules less deference to consid-
erations of efficiency than it does the judge-made background rules of the common
law. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Law and Economics: Paradigm, Politics or Philoso-
phy, LAW AND ECONOMICS 238-39 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989).
47. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman; Progressive Law and Economics - And
the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 343 (1988) ("A reformist law and
economics denies the primacy of the existing distribution of property rights while re-
taining the assumption of methodological individualism that is central to the eco-
nomic approach."). One might wonder why such a straightforward approach needs
the qualifier "reformist."
48. Cf. Irony, supra note 5, at 1184 (one should "employ[ ] simple tools of eco-
nomic analysis to explore the merits" of zoning reform); MALLACH, supra note 7, at
87, (one should figure out "who is to benefit" and then decide if the reform is worth-
while); Choppin, supra note 8, at 2057 & n.5 (it is impossible to determine an objec-
tive baseline for regulation, but "one can deduce a cost increasing effect as well as a
tendency to price out certain income groups"). One is also reminded of the method-
ological statements of the economist Adolph Lowe, ON ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE chs.
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inquiry into the merits of affordable housing in exclusive areas is
consistent with the view that a zoning analysis generally should
proceed with a straightforward examination of intentions or
outcomes.
II. "Inclusionary" Zoning: Theoretical Shortcomings of
Ellickson's Irony
Robert Ellickson's article The Irony of "Inclusionary Zoning"
appeared in the Southern California Law Review in 1981, and in a
collection of essays on housing policy in 1982.49 Ellickson argues
that inclusionary zoning should be seen as a subset of exclusionary
zoning-as a means for suburbs to limit growth. Inclusionary pro-
grams slow growth by imposing a "double tax" on developers.50
The first tax is the cost of building inclusionary units and selling or
renting them at a loss to poor persons. This tax decreases the
amount of housing supplied. The second tax is the forced inclusion
of poor residents in new developments. This tax decreases the de-
mand for new housing. According to Ellickson, suburban land
owners like these effects because they increase the resale value of
their old homes (which will compete with less new construction).
Although the data in Ellickson's article is taken from particular
experiences of local governments in California, both Irony and
those who cite it claim national applicability for its conclusions.5
Professor Ellickson's article begins the task of determining who
actually wins and loses under different zoning rules, and attempts
3, 5 (2d ed. 1977) (modern economics can no longer afford to be philosophical; it
should specify the means to achieve politically chosen ends), and the sociologist Max
Weber, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, 129, 143-
45 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1958) (jurisprudence and economics cannot
determine ultimate principles; they can only show us what rules will help achieve a
given objective).
49. Supra note 5.
50. This is not a traditional tax on income or sales, but rather an added cost, im-
posed on builders and developers by government regulation.
51. See, e.g., TUCKER, supra note 7, at 14 ("Thus, inclusionary zoning ordinances
designed to create 'affordable housing' have instead created a system whereby estab-
lished residents of an exclusion-minded community can limit housing construction
while providing subsidized housing to knowledgeable insiders-all under the pretense
of helping the poor. It is no surprise that cities such as San Francisco and Boston...
have ended up with large homeless populations."); FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 327-28
("It would be erroneous to conclude.., that communities can ignore cases like Mt.
Laurel. Even if they could, internal guilt pangs in many suburbs would require some
response. Fortunately for such communities, a device has been developed that meets
the appearance of equity while in fact excluding most development. It is called, ironi-
cally, 'inclusionary zoning."').
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to identify what effect those rules have on the residential market.
The article also points out a possible danger of inclusionary reform:
suburban homeowners may use it to restrict new construction.
However, the basic premise of Irony-that inclusionary zoning is a
tax on development that effectively decreases the supply of afford-
able housing-fits neither economic theory nor actual programs.
Broken down to its essentials, Ellickson's article makes three mis-
takes typical to law and economics discourse about housing reform
generally. 52
A. Mistaken Assumption: All Incusionary Reforms
Are Not Alike
Inclusionary programs come in a variety of forms: some require
construction at high density, some at low density; some set prices
for the rental or sale of the inclusionary units, some let the market
decide; some occur in areas with strong demand, some in markets
with few interested buyers; some occur to remedy unconscionable,
historical exclusions, some seem hardly necessary; some are oner-
ous to developers, some developers lobby for and happily accept.
Ellickson, at different points in his article, notes each variation and
cites a particular example from California's experience. When he
begins his economic analysis, however, all inclusionary programs
are reducible to three elements:
(i) the taxation of new housing construction (to raise revenue
for local social programs);
(ii) the provision of deep housing subsidies to a tiny fraction of
eligible middle- or lower-income families (to enable those fami-
lies to reside in new housing projects); and
(iii) the spending at step (ii) of revenues generated at step (i)
without the legislative oversight that typically constrains govern-
ment spending programs (e.g., budget review). 53
These three elements have little in common with the majority of
inclusionary zoning programs. Most inclusionary rules are actively
sought by developers, and can hardly be considered taxes.54 Even
52. Strikingly similar flaws in conventional law and economics wisdom regarding
other housing law topics are described generally in Kennedy, supra note 28 (the war-
ranty of habitability applied to endangered stock can bolster the supply of housing in
a stagnant market), and Note, Reassessing Rent Control: Its Economic Impact in a
Gentrifying Housing Market, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1835 (1988) (rent control applied to
existing stock can increase the supply of housing in a gentrifying market).
53. Irony, supra note 5, at 1184.
54. See id. at 1180. Ellickson admits that "[m]ost inclusionary ordinances entitle
an inclusionary developer to build more dwelling units than the applicable zoning
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the programs that developers fight at first can be profitable for
them in the long-run, largely because of cost learning curves and
new abilities to price discriminate.5 Nor are most inclusionary
rules properly characterized as subsidies to the poor. Persons with
low to moderate incomes, who live at higher density, can often out-
bid the wealthy for suburban land. Although such competition is
illegal under most exclusionary zoning rules, it makes little sense to
normalize the noncompetitive baseline, and call any move toward
competition among income classes a "subsidy. ' ' 56 Finally, inclusio-
nary zoning schemes are not "government spending programs."
The peculiar genius .of inclusionary zoning is that the government
can change the stock of affordable housing and redistribute the
wealth of neighborhoods merely by manipulating the background
rules of property. A vast inclusionary program need not spend a
public dime.57
Some inclusionary zoning programs do contain features that re-
semble the first two of Ellickson's three elements. These pro-
grams, however, are marked by other features that are equally, or
more, relevant. Rules that tax developers allow them to coordi-
nate price discrimination between inclusionary units and non-inclu-
sionary units, meaning more revenue from wealthy buyers.
Inclusionary rules that change the physical composition of the
housing stock result in higher density and often a more efficient
mix of inputs.
The definition of terms in Irony therefore creates a conundrum.
In reading Irony to gain a broad understanding of the economic
significance of all interventions commonly called "inclusionary
zoning," one discovers that Ellickson's analysis is incomplete. If
one reads the analysis narrowly, to find an explanation of only
those "inclusionary" regimes characterized by the three elements
listed, it becomes apparent that Ellickson's analytic framework is
only relevant to rare, and easily avoidable, circumstances.
restrictions would otherwise allow[,]" and that, "[w]ithout question, a density bonus
can reduce (or conceivably eliminate) the net tax that an inclusionary program im-
poses on a developer." Id. However, he dismisses the idea that density bonuses could
be large enough to make inclusionary construction profitable, citing to a single survey
by the California Building Industry Association. See id. at 1181 n.71.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 141-144.
56. Cf Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d
390, 449 (N.J. 1983) ("It is nonsense to single out inclusionary zoning ... and label it
'socio-economic' if that is meant to imply that other aspects of zoning are not.").
57. Of course, any rule change requires expenditures to write, promulgate, and
enforce the rule.
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B. Mistaken Baseline: There Is No "Ftee Market" in Housing
Ellickson's economic analysis begins with a free market in hous-
ing-a strange choice given his own recognition of the vast back-
ground of exclusionary rules.58 Perhaps the history of the
economic analysis in Irony explains the choice of baseline. The
analysis comes from an earlier article by Ellickson on governmen-
tally-imposed suburban growth controls, like environmental re-
strictions and sewer system exactions. 59 A rule requiring all
developers to pay a per-unit fee to. the city for the construction of
an unnecessary sidewalk may well function as a tax and decrease
the number of new units built.60 But it does not follow that such an
analysis can be applied to rules which remove restrictions on lot use
and allow developers to build at higher density.61 As explained be-
low, inclusionary rules tend to increase supply, put property in the
hands of those who value it the most, and mitigate cartel restric-
tions on the supply of residential land. In this respect, they are
more analogous to "tax relief" than "taxation."
Ellickson relies on circular argumentation to show that the cur-
rent housing market is free and efficient: "the fact that market
forces tend to produce economically stratified neighborhoods cre-
ates a prima facie case that this stratification is efficient." 62 Such
claims ignore the zoning rules within which "market forces" oper-
ate (and these zoning rules are the subject of the debate). A com-
munity zoning differently could encourage the integration of people
of different income classes, and inclusionists could then opine that
integration must be efficient because "market forces" produced it.
Of course, one might interpret Ellickson's claim to be like Tie-
bout's: the zoning rules adopted by any local community will be
more efficient than alternative zoning rules that could be adopted
because the local community is in the best position to properly,
value any relevant externalities. But Ellickson, unlike the early.
proponents of the Tiebout theory, recognizes that local communi-
ties are in a particularly poor position for setting neutral rules.
58. Ellickson does not claim that exclusionary zoning does not exist; in fact, he
attacks inclusionary zoning as merely another exclusionary phenomenon. Irony,
supra note 5, at 1170.
59. Growth Controls, supra note 18.
60. Id. at 398.
61. Ellickson has his own ironies. In Growth Controls, he calls exclusionary low-
density zoning an inefficient "tax"-a "deadweight loss that benefits no one." Id. at
397. But one can only wonder how steps taken to alleviate this "tax"-such as grant-
ing variances from the exclusionary rule-can also be considered an additional "tax."
62. Irony, supra note 5, at 1200.
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Why such communities' rules deserve deference as "efficient" is
not explained.
C. Mistaken Model: Filtering and the Fungible Home
Ellickson rests much of his'argument on the filter theory of hous-
ing production. Commentators blame the filter theory for aban-
donment,63 gentrification, 6 the concentration of poverty,65 and the
perpetuation of racial segregation.66 Nevertheless, the influence-of
the theory, on Ellickson and others, has been profound. Concep-
tually, the filter theory sees the housing market as two ladders.67
On the supply ladder are houses, arranged according to quality.
On the demand ladder are housing consumers, arranged according
to income. When a new house is built at the top of the supply
ladder, the highest person on the demand ladder moves into it,
leaving an old house vacant. Since this vacant house is better than
the house belonging to the second highest family on the demand
ladder, that family sells and moves into the now second best house
on the supply ladder. The process continues, and every consumer
eventually moves up a notch.
The logic of the model is appealing. The version I have
presented is oversimplified, of course, but proponents of the model
agree with its conclusion: the construction of new luxury homes
benefits everybody. True proponents of the theory, Ellickson
among them, add another claim: the construction of one luxury
house tends to benefit the poorest consumer as much as would the
construction of one cheaper house. .
The price prediction element of filter theory is hardly novel: an
increase in supply decreases price. The theory, however, has two
additional elements that are critical, in my :opinion, for anyone in-
terested in American housing policy to understand. First, it pre-
supposes a unitary market for all housing. A drive through any
American city suggests the opposite. The market for living space
looks highly differentiated. Consumers appear to bid, not against
63. Aoki, supra note 27, at 797-814.
64. See Reassessing Rent Control, supra note 52, at 1835-41 (1988) (arguing that
gentrification removes stock from the affordable housing market without providing
replacement units).
65. See Wilson, supra note 4, at 9-11 (discussing the concentration of urban pov-
erty and arguing that the joblessness of inner-city residents is reinforced by the social
isolation of impoverished neighborhoods); see generally DANIEL R. FUSFELD &
TIMOTHY BATES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE URBAN GHETTO (1984).
66. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2.
67. The image is from Aoki, supra note 27, at 798.
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everybody, but against particular peers interested in particular
types of spaces. Markets seem divided by legal rules, eligibility re-
quirements, social walls, and the simple inability of every house
built for person-type A to fit the needs of person-type B. The filter
theory lets housing policy ignore all that segmentation: the growth
and dispersal of housing stock occurs in borderless, imaginary
space. That accomplishment is even more impressive in light of
empirical research which backs our intuitive sense of market
differentiation.68
The other significant element of filter theory is the practical ob-
servation that, from the government's perspective, building a home
for the rich is cheaper than building a home for the poor. If the
government wants to increase housing stock, so goes the theory, it
is silly to subsidize low income housing construction. Any money
spent must do all the work itself, because the poor have little credit
or income with which to supplement the government's expendi-
tures. On the other hand, that same subsidy, given to the wealthy,
has a substantially higher multiplier effect-generating more hous-
ing with fewer public resources. In this respect, filtering policy is
quite the opposite of a laissez faire or "free market" approach to
housing construction. A housing policy based on the filter theory
calls for the active redistribution of wealth to subsidize buyers and
builders of luxury homes.69
Acceptance of filter theory leads Ellickson to a technical mistake
that he shares with most others who argue that filtering will ade-
quately house the poor. Ellickson defines the "supply" of housing
solely according to its market value. He pays no attention to how
inclusionary zoning rules change the number and type of units
built. That approach may work for some purposes, especially when
it is necessary to construct a single market model, but it cannot
68. See generally WILLIAM APGAR, THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING (1990)
(observing that renters and owners do not usually compete for the same spaces; and
although rental space does compete with ownership space, it consistently loses); Ford,
supra note 2 (arguing that market forces cannot cross neighborhood and jurisdictional
barriers because of racism and the geographical implications of certain rules of law).
69. In the 1980s, the consumption of housing among the wealthy was heavily sub-
sidized, ostensibly in order to solve the housing crisis among the poor. The Kemp-
Roth tax cuts and the Internal Revenue Code's Accelerated Cost Recovery System,
which provided tax incentives to luxury housing developers, joined existing subsidies
to high-end development such as the mortgage interest deduction and certain capital
gains loopholes. See Aoki, supra note 27, at 790. The money that was previously
earmarked for the provision of public housing and the subsidization of low-end devel-
opment, was redistributed, thereby ostensibly reducing waste. Id.
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evaluate whether an inclusionary zoning intervention increases the
housing stock.
For example, imagine that a luxury house sells for $100,000, and
an affordable house $60,000. At these prices, an inclusionary rule
that causes three affordable houses to be built instead of two lux-
ury homes actually reduces the "supply" of housing. More reasons
why this method is inappropriate are presented in Part III. For
now it is enough to note that an inclusionary program seeks to sup-
ply affordable units, not expensive ones-and the cheapness of the
units should not make them less significant in calculating the pro-
gram's success.7°
III. Inclusionary Zoning: The Three Legal Regimes
"Inclusionary zoning" encompasses three ideal-typical legal re-
gimes. 71 Each regime has predictable economic consequences.
Regime One-the voluntary inclusionary program-lets devel-
opers choose whether to build according to the existing zoning
rules or seek a density variance on the condition that they set aside
part of the development for low-income housing. This regime can
never be analyzed as a tax on developers because the variance/set-
aside is sought by developers themselves. More importantly, the
regime will always increase the stock of affordable housing-mea-
sured either in market value or in number of units created.
Regime To-the mandatory inclusionary program-takes away
a developer's choice. It requires the developer to dedicate to low-
income use part of any new development above a certain size, but
offers a density bonus to compensate the developer for possible
losses. When compared to the exclusionary status quo, Regime
TWo will usually have the same effects as Regime One. However, it
is possible to use Regime Two more aggressively than Regime One,
70. For a more realistic measurement of filtering effects in the context of inclusio-
nary intervention, see Calton Homes, Inc. v. Council on Affordable Hous., 582 A.2d
1024 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (holding that, in determining whether a local
jurisdiction has met its fair-share affordable housing requirement, a court can take
into account the projected number of units, built for middle- and high-income resi-
dents, which will filter down to low-income use).
71. The three regimes are ideal-typical in the Weberian sense. None corresponds
exactly to a particular intervention in the real world, but, together, they represent the
economically significant components of most real world interventions. Cf. Max
Weber, The Social Psychology of the World Religions in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS
IN SOCIOLOGY, 267, 292 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1958) ("[T]hese
presentations do not claim to offer a well-rounded picture of world religions. Those
features peculiar to the individual religions, in contrast to other religions, but which at
the same time are important for our interest, must be brought out strongly.").
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eventually imposing inclusionary obligations that developers would
not freely choose. Moving from Regime One to Regime Two in
this manner has two effects on the housing stock. The higher costs
of development may decrease total development activity; but
higher density per development will increase the number of units
built for any given amount of investment. The final question is em-
pirical, but a further increase in the stock of affordable housing is
likely for a variety of reasons (outlined below), not the least of
which is the inelasticity of key inputs (land) and the ability of the
developer to pass on the costs of the program to wealthier
consumers.
72
Regime Three is included just to make a point. Never used in
the real world, Regime Three requires the developer to set aside
units for people who otherwise could not afford them, but allows
no density variance to offset possible losses. Surprisingly, even Re-
gime Three will usually increase the aggregate housing stock avail-
able to low income renters or buyers. In any given market, the
answer depends on the ability of the developer to reap profits from
price discrimination, and the effectiveness and speed with which
luxury housing units, would otherwise filter down to low income
residents.
The regimes are presented in order of difficulty, or how hard it is
to justify them with standard law and economics reasoning.
Presented with the abstract question, almost everyone would think
that Regime One could increase the supply of affordable housing.
Some might think the same for Regime Two. Few, if any, would
put money on Regime Three. The increasing difficulty of the three
arguments suggests a principle for presenting the economic con-
cepts that are relevant to more than one regime: an economic com-
plication will be introduced only when it is necessary to justify
adoption of the particular regime being discussed. Consistent with
this principle, the discussion of the voluntary inclusionary program
provides the reader with a basic understanding of the economic
effects of a move away from the typical exclusionary system. The
72. Included in the analysis of Regime Two is an analysis of a hybrid regime that
does not have a formal system of set-asides. Under the hybrid regime-which can be
called density zoning or "growth management"-a new development must have a cer-
tain proportion of high density units, even if such unitsbring in less revenue than low-
density units. The developer can then sell the inclusionary units at whatever price the
market supports. Essentially a simple policy of rezoning, the hybrid has economic
effects similar to a set-aside regime. It warrants separate consideration because its
administrative costs and redistributive effects are less than those of the typical Re-
gime Two intervention. See infra Part III.B. and accompanying notes.
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discussions of Regimes TWo and Three compare these regimes with
the voluntary inclusionary program in an attempt to show why ad-
ditional steps can and sometimes should be taken.
The approach risks confusion only in regard to two concepts,
perhaps the most interesting ideas raised in the pages that follow.
The first is the developer's ability to price discriminate in a
mandatory inclusionary regime and capture additional revenue
from wealthy home buyers. In both Regime TWo and Regime
Three, price discrimination mitigates developer losses. The effect
is larger and best studied, however, under Regime Three. The sec-
ond concept is Filter Loss, the difference between the units added
to the stock of high-end housing and the units "received" by the
target population. Filter Loss increases the relative advisability of
all three interventions. However, the extent of Filter Loss is iso-
lated and studied in the discussion of Regime Three.
A. Regime One: Voluntary Inclusionary Programs
To a large extent, it is not the presence, but the absence, of a free
market in housing that has helped create a shortage of affordable
homes for many Americans. And the first repressed fact about in-
clusionary zoning is that many, if not most, inclusionary programs
increase the profitability of housing construction. This is why the
vast majority of inclusionary programs are actively sought by build-
ers and developers.73
There are two types of voluntary inclusionary programs. Both
involve a regional authority granting builders choices to build in
profitable ways that the exclusionary system otherwise would not
allow. The first is the "builder's remedy," under which developers
can challenge exclusionary decisions of local zoning boards on be-
half of the public interest.74 Statutory forms of this type of volun-
73. See, e.g., Irony, supra note 5, at 1181 ("[T]he construction of inclusionary
housing in Orange County has sometimes proved profitable. There, mainly because
of the absence of sale price controls, a developer may gain more from the density
bonus than he loses from having to coinply with the inclusionary requirements."); see
also Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 53-55 (arguing that builders, not courts or administrators,
do the.best job of enforcing inclusionary zoning rules).
74. Court challenges to particularly burdensome regulation have always been pos-
sible. See Growth Management, supra note 14, at 1129 (citing early cases decided
under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard). The builder's remedy represents an
acceleration of the trend to allow such challenges, usually using an administrative
procedure rather than state court litigation.
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tary inclusionary program have been adopted in Massachusetts,75
Rhode Island,76 California," Connecticut,78 and Hawaii.79 The first
statewide voluntary inclusionary program, still the best example, is
the Massachusetts "Anti-Snob" Zoning Act.8°
The Anti-Snob Act lets developers who are denied permits or
variances to build affordable housing appeal the decision to the lo-
cal zoning board.81 If the local zoning board does not schedule a
hearing to address the merits of the proposal, the permit is deemed
granted. If the developer loses the appeal, he or she can obtain
review of the local decision (as of right) before a state committee.
The state committee then decides if the denial of the variance or
permit is consistent with regional housing needs. The local zoning
board must demonstrate an important "health, safety, environmen-
tal, design, open space, or other local concern," and that this con-
cern clearly outweighs the regional need for affordable housing.
There is a strong presumption against the municipality unless it al-
ready contains a threshold level of affordable, multi-family housing
units.82 Massachusetts does not police the income level of those
persons who rent or buy the multi-family units; the state's program
75. Act of Aug. 23, 1969, ch. 774, 1969 Mass. Acts 712 (codified at MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 40B §§ 20-23 (Law. Co-op. 1993)).
76. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-1 to -8 (1991).
77. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65589.5(d)-(h)(2) (West Supp. 1996).
78. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-30g(a)-(f) (West Supp. 1996).
79. The Hawaii law combines a voluntary inclusionary program with a bribe-
developers are given state subsidies to encourage use of the Remedy. See HAW. REV.
STAT. tit. 6, § 46-15.1 (1993 & 1995 Supp.) (authorizing, among other things, county-
developer partnerships and interim construction loans); MOVING AHEAD, supra note
14, at 36.
80. See infra note 83. The other voluntary inclusionary program regimes have not
been consistently applied, because the reviewing state agencies often hesitate to strike
local denials of building permits. See Growth Management, supra note 14, at 1134
(other states do not have the political power to enforce inclusionary rules); Irony,
supra note 5, at 1168 (California local governments are too powerful and regional
reform is difficult).
81. See generally Paul K. Stockman, Anti-Snob Zoning in Massachusetts: Assessing
One Attempt at Opening the Suburbs to Affordable Housing, 78 VA. L. REV. 535
(1992).
82. The burden shifts to the developer if 10% of the local housing stock consists of
low- and moderate-income units, if 1.5% of the total land area is devoted to subsi-
dized housing, or if the development is excessively large in proportion to the commu-
nity. See id. (citing MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 20). The Rhode Island and
Connecticut statutes have similar provisions. See supra text accompanying notes 76 &
78.
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seeks to increase available housing stock, believing that filtering
effects will result in a workable distribution.83
The builder's remedy, as discussed in more detail below, cer-
tainly has advantageous effects on the housing market. However, it
may not provide a significant amount of low-income housing in ar-
eas where the poor simply do not have the income to pay market
prices, even market prices for high-density construction. Unless
the government is prepared to subsidize the poor's purchasing
power, the builder's remedy will either not be used by builders, or
will be used to construct middle-income housing, benefitting the
poor only by the process of filtering. These filtering benefits are
certainly important, but are no substitute for the construction of a
new affordable unit in the first place, as discussed in detail in the
section on Regime Three.
This problem of the buying power of the poor can be solved us-
ing market forces, without resort to government transfer payments,
by a system of cross-subsidization: a "voluntary set-aside pro-
gram." Essentially, the voluntary set-aside program is a condi-
tional builder's remedy which utilizes the massive demand for
forbidden suburban uses at market prices to fund the sale of a
number of low-income units at prices below the cost of such units'
construction. It says to builders: "We will allow you to build more
market rate units in disregard of zoning rules, if you are willing to
sell low-income units below your per unit marginal cost."
Several initial points about the voluntary set-aside program
should be made. First, builders choose to participate in it. As a
result, unless builders overestimate the profitability of low income
construction (unlikely), a voluntary set-aside program can only
have a positive effect on builder profits and the value of undevel-
oped land. If the sale of units below cost becomes so burdensome
as to offset the profits that the developer makes from the zoning
variances he receives in return, the developer will choose to build
under the old, exclusionary rules.
Second, the voluntary set-aside program may be more profitable
for builders than the builder's remedy. Most builder's remedy ju-
83. By 1992, the process had facilitated the construction of 20,000 affordable units.
Ninety percent of the projects turned down by local boards and appealed have been
approved by the appellate authority. See MOVING AHEAD, supra note 14, at 15. But
cf Peter Canelo, After Twenty Years, Anti-Snob Zoning Proves Ineffective, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 1, 1981, at 1 (local resistance has resulted in only twenty-eight of the
state's 351 communities reaching the 10% goal); Stockman, Anti-Snob Zoning, supra
note 81, at 557 (affordable units have benefited the elderly more than the urban
poor).
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risdictions grant relief from local zoning rules only for proposals to
build affordable housing. The set-aside program gives builders a
variance to construct whatever sort of housing is the most profita-
ble, including dense, luxury housing, as long as some portion of the
resulting profits are used to build affordable units below cost. In
areas where putting the first condominium complex in Arcadia
would create huge returns, builders could fund a considerable in-
clusionary project and still profit handsomely.
Third, the voluntary set-aside program is self-limiting and cannot
be misused. The program is driven by the developer's ability to
capture the pent-up value of the exclusive neighborhood (the fol-
lowing section introduces the concept of the Exclusivity Premium,
describing its various components). As the remedy is used more
frequently, however, the market value of living in the neighbor-
hood will fall because of the density of construction and the type of
person that inclusionary zoning allows to live there. As the Exclu-
sivity Premium that comes with the purchase of a home in the
neighborhood falls, builders will receive less for the market-rate
units they construct. No longer willing to pay the inclusionary pen-
alty necessary to get a density variance for market rate units, future
developers will opt out of the inclusionary zoning regime, choosing
instead to build without penalty under the exclusionary rules. The
new low-density construction will buttress the falling Exclusivity
Premium. In the long run, the competition between the two sys-
tems (exclusionary and inclusionary) will keep either from being
used too intensively.
Finally, the voluntary set-aside program is not incompatible with
the builder's remedy. A jurisdiction can easily offer builders all
three options-dense low income construction at market rates,
dense luxury construction with a set-aside, or low density luxury
construction under the exclusionary status quo.
The effects of both types of voluntary programs on the supply of
housing, the profits of builders, and the value of land in the juris-
diction are similar. The distributive effects of the two voluntary
programs are different, however, because a voluntary set-aside pro-
gram often involves the transfer of considerable wealth from ex-
isting homeowners to the purchasers of low income units. The
following discussion focuses on the voluntary set-aside program,
largely because its economic effects are more interesting. Differ-
ences between that program, also simply called "Regime One,"
and the builder's remedy are highlighted throughout.
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1. Why Builders Want Density Variances
a. Arbitrage Profits
A density variance, as the name implies, allows a builder to build
more homes on a plot of land than zoning rules would otherwise
allow. Builders want density variances whenever high-density
users (often the less wealthy) can .outbid low-density users (often
the rich) for space. Without exclusionary zoning, wealthy people
would often be outbid. The historical growth of Boston provides
an example. The city grew in a system of concentric rings, with
large single-family homes always on the outermost edge. As mar-
ket pressure in the inner rings grew, low-income residents bought
out the higher-income residents who lived on the outer edge.8
Contrary to modem protestations by suburban landowners about
poorer newcomers' effects on property values, the value of residen-
tial land on the outer edges of unzoned Boston increased dramati-
cally as population density increased. Higher-income homeowners
sold, made a profit, and used the money to move out further.8 5
Speaking very generally, the market power of excluded low-in-
come demand is even stronger now than in 19th century Boston,
which was, to a much larger extent, a free market in residential
land.s6 The ubiquity of exclusive zoning today has created a
shortage of residential land for multi-family units and a surplus of
residential land for single-family uses. A suburban developer,
therefore, can make an arbitrage profit by "moving" land zoned for
the single-family market, where land is cheap, to the multi-family
market, where land is artificially dear.
b. Construction Cost Savings
High density construction uses radically fewer resources per unit
than low density construction. The use of less land is only one
source of cost savings. Figure 1 shows one economist's estimate of
non-land cost savings created by "clustering"-building units near
one another:8 7
84. In other words, land on the outer edges was transferred to the highest-valued
use. See SAM B. WARNER, JR., STREETCAR SUBURBS: THE PROCESS OF GROWTH IN
BOSTON, 1870-1890 (1962).
85. Id.
86. Of course, the role of race and class in 19th century Boston meant that the
market for land was-as a matter of historical fact rather than economic ideal-not as
free as the text above supposes.
87. Potential cost savings are shown as a percentage of the total per unit cost of a
typical single-family subdivision home; the same amount of land is used in all col-
umns. The table is adapted from comparative cost information contained in MAL-
1996]
52 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIV
Figure 1: Cost Savings From Higher Density Construction
Cluster Cluster Garden High-rise
Subdivision Townhouse Apartment Apartment
Streets 14% 31% 52% 74%
Sewers 34% 58% 75% 85%
Drainage 33% 55% 71% 82%
Water 34% 57% 70% 82%
Gas & Electric 42% 63% 74% 85%
Total Improvements 24% 50% 67% 80%
These cost savings result directly from the technical economies of
denser construction. Not included are cost savings that would arise
if developers were no longer obligated to comply with other exclu-
sionary restrictions. Such restrictions take many forms and often
exist for no purpose other than to screen the income level of poten-
tial buyers in order to protect or increase the neighborhood's ex-
clusivity.88 Such restrictions include square footage requirements,
set-back requirements, excessive paving of streets where there is
little traffic, sidewalks where there are few pedestrians, unwar-
ranted parking spaces, drainage systems, and other burdens.89
c. More Efficient Use of Productive Resources
A related source of cost savings is the increased ability of devel-
opers to use a more efficient mix of inputs for the construction of
homes. Site improvements are a substitute for land.90 Zoning re-
strictions that forbid the use of substitutes effectively force buyers
to consume more land than they otherwise would. This results in
the under-utilization of cost-effective construction inputs like la-
bor, materials, design, and technology. 91 Of course, the services
specifically called for by the exclusionary system (e.g., suburban
driveway paving) will be used less. To lament this convincingly,
however, a critic of the voluntary set-aside program would have to
show that the suburban zoning authority is in a better position than
LACH, supra note 7, at 60 (citing THE COSTS OF SPRAWL (Real Estate. Res. Corp.
1974)). But see RANDALL J. POZDENA, THE MODERN ECONOMICS OF HOUSING 51
(1989) (after a certain point, higher density may lead to increasing per unit costs be-
cause of the difficulties in building increasingly taller structures).
88. See Growth Controls, supra note 18.
89. More examples appear in MALLACH, supra note 7, at 61-62.
90. See POZDENA, supra note 87, at 53-54 (guessing that the relevant elasticity is
about 0.5).
91. In this way, many American suburbs overuse space, using sprawl rather than
quality of design to create a feeling of comfort or opulence.
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either the developer or the buyer to gauge the relative value of
additional driveways. 92
2. Impact on the Housing Market
A voluntary set-aside program will raise the supply of multi-fam-
ily housing whenever there are builders who take advantage of the
program. This increase in the supply of multi-family housing in an
area, say a particular suburb, should have two related effects. First,
the price of multi-family housing in the suburbs should fall. Sec-
ond, the price of multi-family housing in the city and adjacent sub-
urbs should fall, as competing owners and tenants move away.
a. Supply in the Suburbs
The basic economics of the voluntary set-aside program are de-
picted in the demand and supply graph below. The parties who
stand to benefit most from the increased supply are new consumers
of housing, builders, and landowners. Exactly how much each
group will benefit depends upon the elasticity of the relevant sup-
ply and demand curves. The following graphs assume that con-
sumer demand is considerably, but not perfectly, price elastic (i.e.,
a small decrease in price will result in a significant increase in the
number of potential purchasers). Not all suburban jurisdictions fit
that assumption. In some, the number of potential entrants is lim-
ited by demographics, racism, or a huge gap between the asking
price and the price most potential homeowners can pay. Neverthe-
less, considerable elasticity can be assumed for jurisdictions with
exclusionary zoning laws. If demand were inelastic, exclusionary
zoning would be unnecessary or ineffective, since the price distor-
tion it creates would not affect the number of in-migrants.
Figure 2 shows three hypothetical, long-term supply curves
(short-term supply is almost perfectly elastic) 93 for a jurisdiction
which is considering the imposition of a voluntary inclusionary zon-
92. It is possible (although difficult) to argue that driveways, sewer systems, set-
backs, and lot density need to be regulated as public goods. Even if successful, the
argument does not prove that the local official will have the knowledge or motivation
to set factor use requirements appropriately.
93. The supply of housing stock is perfectly inelastic in the short-run. The supply
of housing services (how much housing that stock can provide) is slightly elastic be-
cause of vacancy rates and the ability to double up. The short-run elasticity has been
estimated at 0.2 (a 10% increase in price causes a 2% increase in services provided).
See generally POZDENA, supra note 87, at 35-46.
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Figure 2: Regime One--Supply Curves
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ing program.94 The first supply curve represents the supply of
housing units under an exclusionary zoning regime. Supply is very
price-elastic up to a certain quantity. As more units are built, how-
ever, appropriate land in the suburban jurisdiction becomes more
expensive to locate and less convenient to develop. Supply is less
price elastic at high quantities, when the jurisdiction begins to run
out of appropriate tracts.95 The graph assumes that the zoning de-
cision makers will not change the exclusivity of the regime regard-
less of the level of demand. That assumption may be partially
incorrect-single suppliers (landowners) or consumer representa-
tives (developers) may bribe the local polity toward a more effi-
cient result than the exclusionary baseline otherwise allows. In any
event, the first equilibrium (EI) generates a price of P1 and a
quantity of Q1 homes.
The second supply curve shows the supply of units with a volun-
tary set-aside program widely available. The outward shift of the
supply curve reflects the additional units for which a variance is
obtained. The shift increases in magnitude as price and/or quantity
increases. The change in magnitude represents the fact that density
variances, although always cost-saving, represent increasingly
larger cost-savings as conveniently-located residential land be-
comes scarcer. For instance, with low demand and abundant land,
94. Supply for larger regions is more elastic. Id. at 45. For example, the long-run
elasticity of housing supply (stock or services) in America has been estimated at .05
by Frank de Leeuw & Nkanta Ekanem, The Supply of Rental Housing, AMER. ECON.
REVIEW 806-17 (1971).
95. The elasticity of the supply curve for all productive factors except land is ex-
tremely elastic. Richard F. Muth, The Demand for Non-Farm Housing, in THE DE-
MAND FOR DURABLE GOODS 29, 44 (Arnold C. Harberger ed., 1960).
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few builder's remedies will be sought and the ones that will be
sought will be small (duplexes). With high demand and scarce
land, builders will seek large variances (apartment buildings). The
second equilibrium (E2) generates price P2 and quantity Q2.
The third supply curve represents the supply of land without ex-
clusionary zoning. It is shifted further out than the voluntary set-
aside program supply curve. That shift represents both the cost of
the variance process and the number of variances requested by
builders that the system does not award (either because the system
is capped by a threshold or because developers sometimes lose in
litigation). It should be noted that the curve does not represent the
elimination of non-exclusionary zoning restrictions (the regulation
of incompatible uses). Non-exclusionary zoning can increase con-
sumer demand for residential housing stock by eliminating nega-
tive externalities like factory smoke or burdensome traffic.96 The
third equilibrium (E3) generates price P3 and quantity Q3.
b. Demand and the Exclusivity Premium
The picture is complicated somewhat when one adds the influ-
ence of exclusionary zoning on market demand. Potential buyers
may pay more than they otherwise would for a home in an area if
the area has exclusionary rules. The price difference-or Exclusiv-
ity Premium-is the purchase price of two types of "goods" that in-
migrants value. First, it is a charge for the jurisdiction's higher re-
turn on property taxes, resulting in better services, a lower tax rate,
or both. Second, it is a charge for the prestige value of the address,
the income or racial homogeneity of one's neighbors, and a sense
of social or physical safety. The demand curve for the voluntary
set-aside program is shifted slightly back at all price levels to reflect
the decrease in the amount of Exclusivity Premium that in-mi-
grants will pay once zoning rules are relaxed. The new equilibrium
point (E4) results in price P4, and quantity Q4, as shown in figure
3.
There are three reasons why this drop in demand is unlikely to be
very large. First, developers make the supply decision based on
profitability, predicting future demand curve shifts. If certain ele-
ments of the community's exclusive charm have a bigger demand-
side effect than the supply-side effect of density variances, develop-
ers will not shoot themselves in the foot by seeking a density bonus
96. Any attempt to locate this distinction cannot withstand analysis; but the exist-
ence of a division, somewhere, is beyond doubt.
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Figure 3: Regime One-Supply and Demand
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conditioned on the payment of an inclusionary penalty. This built-
in safeguard stops the quantity supplied after the intervention (Q4)
from ever dropping lower than the quantity supplied before the
intervention (Q1). Second, developers use several tactics to inte-
grate developments without losing prestige value. One of the sim-
plest and most effective is the construction of the most prestigious-
looking units in a development first.97 Third, the jurisdiction, if it
wishes, can guard against the demand shift by manipulating the size
of the density bonus and subsidy.98
However, there is a better reason to dismiss the demand shift
than its small size. The demand shift actually serves one of the
goals of the inclusionary program: it further decreases the price of
suburban housing. As a matter of economic theory, the demand
shift is troubling because it means that consumers of suburban
housing are getting less of a product that they value. However, one
97. See MALLACH, supra note 7, at 95. Significantly, the ability to integrate in-
come levels changes when one moves from single- to multi-family housing. Id. at 98
(visual homogeneity is easy to achieve in developments with units of varying sizes, but
more difficult to achieve when the entire development is composed of single-family
homes).
98. Jurisdictions using the builder's remedy can also set limits on the inclusionary
program. In Massachusetts, for example, the builder's remedy is shut down as soon as
10% of the units or 1.5% of the land in a community is devoted to affordable housing.
See MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 21-23, supra note 75.
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should consider the peculiar nature of the product (Exclusivity Pre-
mium) that consumers no longer purchase.
The first component of the lost Exclusivity Premium-the higher
return in public services per tax dollar-is not an economic "good"
when looked at from a regional, rather than municipal, perspective.
The higher return on the suburban tax dollar is created by legal
rules that allow the residents of suburbs to pay only for those local
public services (schools, police, fire, water, sewer, parks) that are
offered within the suburban jurisdiction. Although state and fed-
eral money lessens the effect of this tax segregation, suburban resi-
dents do not pay to support many public services offered (or not
offered) by other jurisdictions in the greater metropolitan area
where they live and work. The first part of the lost Exclusivity Pre-
mium, in other words, consists of the suburban residents' profits
from the selective Balkanization of the region's tax base.
Valuing a neighborhood's exclusivity from a regional perspective
suggests that the primary legitimate externalities taken into ac-
count by a local zoning authority in setting an exclusionary bar-
rier-impact on taxes, schools and local public services-are
economic nullities. When a poor family moves into a wealthy sub-
urb, the suburb's per capita tax base will fall, but the region's per
capita tax base will not change. Instead, the tax component of the
Exclusivity Premium will be redistributed from the suburbs to an-
other zoning jurisdiction, as the return in services per tax dollar
moves toward equality throughout the metropolitan area. As
economists are fond of pointing out, if nothing is lost to the region,
the simple distribution of wealth (here property taxes not paid) is
not a valid, first-order economist's concern. We can therefore dis-
count-considerably but not completely-the loss in tax base seg-
regation available for purchase.99
The other part of the Exclusivity Premium, neighborhood pres-
tige and socio-economic homogeneity, cannot be discounted with-
out reference to subjective political values. Some feel that income
segregation is good because it encourages residents of bad neigh-
99. Some commentators use the Tiebout theory of local government to argue that
this selective Balkanization is efficient because it allows consumers a choice about the
type of suburb (low tax/low service or high tax/high service) in which they would like
to live. See, e.g., Bruce Hamilton, Property Taxes and the Tiebout Hypothesis: Some
Empirical Evidence, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS (Edwin S. Mills &
Wallace E. Oates eds., 1975); FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 293-315. I think that argument
cannot stand up against either the presence of so many low tax/high service suburbs
and high tax/low service cities; or against popular opinion that taxation should be
progressive-redistributing wealth from the shielded rich to the fenced-in poor.
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borhoods to work hard so they can move into good ones. Putting
that attitude aside, few commentators would give the desire for
segregation equal status with the physical aspects of a home, at
least when entertaining the question of how much housing society
should produce. Stricter economists, in order to avoid going "nor-
mative," might stick to the principle that only the market can de-
termine value. Most, however,.would likely discount.the "good" of
racial segregation-which may or may not be a significant portion
of a suburb's value to its incumbent and potential residents.
3. Distributive Effects of Regime One
Inclusionary zoning not only increases the amount of housing
built, it transfers to poor and middle-income people the money and
market power they need to buy it. The distribution of wealth
worked by inclusionary zoning can be extremely significant, de-
pending on the market forces at work in a particular jurisdiction.
A voluntary set-aside program transfers wealth from existing
suburban homeowners and people shopping for luxury properties
to developers, contractors, landowners, people shopping for afford-
able housing in the region and, of course, people who move into
inclusionary units. It should be noted, however, that the situation
is not one of simple redistribution (i.e., a zero-sum game). If there
is inefficiency in the exclusionary system-because regional exter-
nalities are not counted by the zoning authority, because illusory
local "externalities" are counted, or because the home owners act
like a cartel-then a move away from that system will create more
wealth in the winners than it takes from the losers.100
a. Existing Homeowners
Existing homeowners in the suburbs will see an increase in the
value of their land and, most likely, a decrease in the total value of
their home (land plus house). The increase in the value of their
land represents the new possibility of a higher-density use., The
decrease in the value of their house represents two separate losses
that will likely offset that gain in land value.
(i) Loss of Exclusivity Premium
Part of the decrease in house value represents the Exclusivity
Premium that the homeowner previously could have obtained
100. The winners here are the landowners, developers, and buyers of dense market
units, and the low income buyers of the below-cost set-aside units. Obviously, the
exact extent to which the transfer is truly "efficient" cannot be predicted easily.
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upon resale. The effect of the Exclusivity Premium on housing
price is considerable. Economists have estimated that it is about
50% as significant in the buying decision as the physical condition
of the unit.' The amount of lost Exclusivity Premium depends on
the number of inclusionary units, the character of these units, the
new residents who live in them, and the attitudes of potential pur-
chasers of the existing residents' homes.
Of course, the welfare of an existing homeowner is affected not
only by the sale price of his home, but also by his or her subjective
valuation of benefits of exclusivity. Special concerns for the "char-
acter" of the neighborhood may significantly decrease the value an
individual attaches to his or her home-as may the possible exist-
ence of racial preferences-even if the market price remains rela-
tively constant. 0 2 Under these circumstances, inclusion would
"force" sales of homes from such residents to newcomers for whom
the changing character is less important.103
(ii) Loss of Cartel Profits
Any drop in resale value that does not correspond to lost Exclu-
sivity Premium represents a partial move from cartel to competi-
tive pricing. When suburban landowners incorporate a physical
area containing residential land, and set rules regarding the dispo-
sal of that land, they have the ability to regulate supply in much the
same manner as a traditional manufacturer's cartel. Because new
stock is a close substitute for old stock,0 4 homeowners who can
limit the amount of new construction may increase the resale value
of their homes. 0 5
There is considerable debate about the size of the price change
caused by suburban land cartels, although no responsible study
claims that the effects are insignificant. 0 6 Cartelization is blamed
101. See POZDENA, supra note 87, at 145.
102. These preferences are described in the literature on "tipping"-cumulative
and accelerating change in the racialcomposition of neighborhoods. See, e.g., RICH-
ARD P. TAUB ET AL., PATHS OF NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE: RACE AND CRIME IN
URBAN AMERICA 140-66 (1984) (presenting an equilibrium theory of change in the
race-based component of the Exclusivity Premium).
103. Id.
104. Irony, supra note 5, at 1191.
105. FiSCHEL, supra note 7, at 141-43.
106. The word "study" is significant. Some economists have suggested that the
availability of alternative sites erases the possibility of monopoly profits. This work is
of no use because it merely hypothesizes the availability of such sites. Muth, for in-
stance, suggests that consumers cannot suffer from the oligopoly power of suburbanjurisdictions because they can always go start their own new communities elsewhere.
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for both a high national level of prices and particular local aberra-
tions.10 7 The most frequently cited example of the latter is the rise
to power in Maryland's Fairfax, Montgomery, and Prince Georges
counties of anti-development politicians in the early 1970s.10 8 Pre-
sumably in response, "the average sale price of new homes in the
Washington area jumped 101% between 1968 and 1975, easily the
largest increase over that period in any major metropolitan
area."
0 9
The incentive and ability of a jurisdiction to reap cartel profits
from a system of density restrictions depends upon the jurisdic-
tion's market power (the elasticity of the demand curve that the
cartel faces). Size is one means of achieving market power, and a
single jurisdiction may be large enough to have a price effect by
virtue of its own zoning rules. However, some research suggests
that large jurisdictions with centralized government structures are
also more likely to be dissuaded from cartel behavior by developer
lobbying. 10
The twenty-five largest American metropolitan areas are, with a
few exceptions, Balkanized. Such metropolitan areas with many
different incorporated cities suffer from cartelization in two in-
stances."' First, cartels arise if small jurisdictions coordinate their
behavior. Because zoning is legal, price fixing is not difficult. An
incentive to cheat the cartel exists only if the jurisdictions can levy
development fees, or develop some other means of exacting and
accepting payment from buyers for the granting of variances.
Second, a suburban jurisdiction may possess "unique attributes,"
to use Ellickson's term. Indeed, the Balkanization of suburbia
might be understood, not as a sign of the polities' mutual weakness,
but as the result of conscious local decisions to differentiate suc-
cessful suburban products.
Antitrust analysis is not perfectly adaptable to suburban growth
controls-several factors make a suburban cartel far more power-
ful than a cartel of manufacturers. First, the tendency to restrict
See Panel Discussion: Redistribution and Regulation of Housing, supra note 19, at 803-
04 (statement of Richard Muth).
107. E.g. Growth Controls, supra note 18, at 434. But see FISCHEL, supra note 7, at
147 (demonstrating Fischel's dislike for the monopoly model, although he grudgingly
concedes its relevance).
108. Growth Controls, supra note 18, at 434.
109. Id. at 434 n.131.
110. See Panel Discussion: Redistribution and Regulation of Housing, supra note 19,
at 803.
111. See FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 148; Growth Controls, supra note 18, at 408.
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supply and increase price is not mitigated by concerns about vol-
ume. A manufacturing cartel loses volume (and therefore some
revenue) with every price increase. The suburban homeowner, on
the other hand, has only one house, and cannot usually produce
more. He or she will price above the level of a normal cartel, be-
cause owners of undeveloped land, often nonresidents without a
voice in cartel policy, are the only ones who suffer the volume loss.
Second, any decrease in the supply of suburban homes increases
the Exclusivity Premium and thereby increases demand and, even-
tually, price. This "feedback" effect on the Exclusivity Premium
means a greater incentive to restrict supply. Third, the suburban
land cartel is more effective than traditional cartels because mem-
bers can openly coordinate behavior and have a perfect mechanism
to enforce mutual compliance: zoning law.
Cartels restrict production and raise price, causing buyers to pay
more than the economic cost of a good. Cartels also cause alloca-
tive inefficiency because they keep scarce capital in the hands of
persons who are not using it efficiently. The elimination of cartel
prohibitions on the use of a resource-here the land that supports
a house-results in the transfer of that resource to the highest-val-
ued user and use.
b. Buyers of Large Lots
Although the average cost per unit in suburbia will fall, the price
of land (per acre, not per unit) should increase as more land uses
are allowed. The higher price of land means that the total price of
a new low-density, single-family home in the suburban jurisdiction
will likely increase under Regime One.'1 2 The price increase repre-
sents a reduction in a subsidy. Under the exclusionary regime, the
legal prohibition of higher-valued uses subsidized the purchase of
land. Obviously, that subsidy shrinks as developers have more
freedom to use land as the market sees fit.113
c. Builders and Owners of Developable Land
Those who supply the inputs necessary to build homes will bene-
fit under a voluntary set-aside program. It is difficult to say how
much a particular supplier will benefit without detailed knowledge
of local market conditions. In areas where builders have market
112. Unless all the parcels being used for new single-family construction are not
appropriate for multi-family development.
113. Large-lot suburban home buying would remain one of the most heavily subsi-
dized economic decisions in the United States. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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power and/or the ability to exclude rivals, builders may stand to
make considerable profits from the inclusionary system. In areas
where landowners have market power, the landowners will reap
the benefits of an increase in the market value of their land.
There is one complication to the rosy picture. I have said that
builders cannot be harmed by a voluntary set-aside program be-
cause any builder can opt out of a burdensome program and build
under the old rules. But a problem arises for builders who opt out.
Before the opportunity to get the inclusionary variance was avail-
able, the buyers to whom the builder sold homes were basically
assured of a certain population density in the future. When the
voluntary set-aside program is created, however, home buyers will
know that future builders may choose to build under the voluntary
set-aside program. These homebuyers may not pay as much for the
exclusive construction as they otherwise could. Given the natural
limits of the voluntary set-aside program, it is difficult to know how
important to their purchasing decision homebuyers might consider
the possibility of scattered set-asides (remembering, of course, that
a regional intervention means a similar chance of inclusionary de-
velopment throughout the region). To the extent that the fear of
the included poor does harm builder profitability, as it might in
areas marked by racism, the effects of the voluntary set-aside pro-
gram become similar to those of the mandatory set-aside program
"Regime Two," discussed below.
d. The Included Poor
By far the most extraordinary point about the voluntary set-
aside program is its ability to provide, without spending a public
cent, below-cost housing to poor persons who otherwise could not
afford it. The magnitude of the benefit for the poor who need
homes depends on the size of the inclusionary set-aside and the
number of builders who chose to take part in the inclusionary pro-
gram. Obviously, both of these factors in turn depend on how
profitable it will be to build in the exclusionary neighborhood.
These observations lead one directly to an epiphany that combines
both the "invisible hand" logic of classical economics and a modern
sense of fairness: the more extreme and economically unwarranted a
local neighborhood's exclusionary rules, the more incentive builders
will have to construct affordable units in that neighborhood. If a
neighborhood has zoned "fairly" and has zoning rules that do not
exclude all high value residential uses, builders will not have an
incentive to construct affordable units in that neighborhood. In
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other words, the homeowners that have benefitted the most from
the. system of suburban incorporation and inclusionary zoning will
be hit the hardest by the voluntary program. Homeowners in mod-
erately exclusionary jurisdictions will be hit only slightly, or not at
all.
There is one objection to the voluntary set-aside program on
grounds of efficiency. The builder's remedy, which simply allows a
forbidden transaction and sells units at market price, will be effi-
cient unless the ignored zoning rule Was justified by legitimate, re-
gional externalities. The voluntary set-aside program, however,
goes one step further and bestows a good at a price below the mar-
ket price. Such "in-kind" subsidies are roundly criticized as ineffi-
cient by economists, because they contain a restraint on
alienability. A gift of cash, so the theory goes, could be spent as
the recipient sees fit. A gift of a home, however, risks overcon-
sumption and a departure from Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.' 14 One
reply to this criticism is that the efficiency loss from the in-kind
subsidy is unlikely to be greater than the huge efficiency gain from
allowing thousands of forbidden market-rate transactions. But that
reply, although important in justifying a voluntary program as a
replacement for the status quo, is a little disingenuous. It would be
possible, instead of forcing builders to build below cost units, to
require them to pay an amount of money into a fund that would
then be simply distributed to poor. The reply to this argument is
horribly un-economic: such a system is unlikely to be as politically
palatable as a system that simply constructs homes.,
Furthermore, in considering the relationship of the subsidy to
the buying power of the poor, it is also important to remember the
source of the wealth. Even if there are inefficiencies in the expen-
diture of the subsidy, there are few, if any, inefficiencies in the col-
lection of it. Part of the wealth comes from the owners of
undeveloped land. A tax on land rents is essentially efficient." 5
Part of the wealth comes from existing suburban residents. This
part of the transfer is the least problematic: it represents a correc-
tive tax on cartel rent that improves resource allocation. 116  The
114. So claim FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 333; and Irony, supra note 5, at 1196-97.
115. The tax is only "pei'fectly" efficient if all uses of land are equally discour-
aged-otherwise allocative decisions- are changed. Nevertheless, since the 19th cen-
tury, economists have recognized that the price of land (unlike the price of
improvements on land) is pure economic rent (i.e., "producing" land has no cost).
116. See PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 83-85
(4th ed. 1988) (damage actions deter monopolies by threatening to take a portion of
the monopolies' economic rent); Michelle J. White, Suburban Growth Controls: Lia-
19961
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remainder of the wealth comes from non-inclusionary home-buy-
ers. The taking of this tax can be seen as a correction of the alloca-
tive effects of the existing subsidies to luxury home consumption,
subsidies that cause the overconsumption of land relative to other
construction inputs.
e. Buyers of Affordable Housing Who Do Not Receive
Inclusionary Units
Assuming any substitutability of demand, the increase in subur-
ban stock should decrease the price of housing in the entire region.
In the city and less restrictive neighboring suburbs, the increase in
suburban stock will remove some housing buyers, often the wealth-
ier. The departing homeowners will leave behind decent, vacant
housing, and persons with slightly lower incomes will buy it (absent
gentrification or re-industrialization).117 For renters, lower subur-
ban ownership prices will decrease the maximum rent that city
landlords can charge without losing tenants.118 Massive departures
may have side-effects like deterioration and abandonment, but the
voluntary set-aside program, for the reasons mentioned above, is
unlikely to be used so extensively.
f Public Sector Costs
The public costs of a voluntary set-aside program are minimal.
Besides drawing up and implementing regional rules, the only pub-
lic costs involve running the simple system of eligibility controls
that determine who can live in the set-aside units. Jurisdictions
that have mandatory set-aside programs have met these costs by
garnishing a modest portion of the developer's profits from the
density variance. 1 9
The public cost of a builder's remedy regime (where the units are
sold at the market rate) are even less. The builder's remedy re-
quires only a judicial or administrative system for appealing local
zoning decisions. Of course, persons who buy or build the inclusio-
nary units might benefit from existing federal and state affordable
housing programs. Any such subsidies, including housing tax cred-
bility Rules and Pigovian Taxes, 8 LEGAL STUD. 207, 225-30 (1979) (suggesting that
exclusionary zoning be taxed to offset its external social and economic costs); Boger,
supra note 17, at 71 (proposing changes to the tax code so that "property holders in
municipalities that choose to ignore their proscribed housing goals would progres-
sively lose their mortgage interest and property tax deductions.").
117. The limits of this filtering process are described infra in Part III.B.l.a.
118. See POZDENA, supra note 87, at 100-14.
119. See infra Part III.B.2.e.
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its, will make the voluntary set-aside program more effective (i.e.,
more profitable, and therefore more widespread). 120 Research sug-
gests that financing help, in addition to subsidization, is important
when the voluntary set-aside program is meant to encourage own-
ership among the less wealthy. 12
4. Effects of Regime One: Running Summary
The voluntary set-aside program should increase the stock of
housing available to low- or moderate-income persons. In fact,
there is no basis in economic theory for rejecting the voluntary set-
aside program. If overused, the program may damage the Exclu-
sivity Premium that the neighborhood charges its new residents.
But this can only occur if market failure stops the customers of the
developer from valuing the Exclusivity Premium, or from commu-
nicating their preferences to the Builder. Furthermore, most of the
Exclusivity Premium stems from the effects of tax base segrega-
tion-and any change in the local distribution of wealth is not a
regional loss. Finally, the portion of the lost Exclusivity Premium
that remains (feelings of separateness and racism) is simply out-
weighed-empirically and normatively-by the transfer of devel-
opment sites from low to high value uses.
Although certainly not necessary to justify it as a matter of
sound economics and housing policy, the distributive fairness of the
voluntary set-aside program is an additional benefit. It transfers
wealth from those persons who have benefitted most from the sys-
tem of exclusionary rules to those whom the system has most
injured.
B. Regime Two: Mandatory Set-Asides With Density Bonus
It would be nice if one could blame the American housing mar-
ket's failure to provide inexpensive homes solely on exclusionary
zoning rules. Such rules certainly have done their share of harm,
but even if exclusionary rules were eliminated tomorrow, the lack
of buying power among the poor would still result in some home-
120. See generally THE AFFORDABLE CITY: TOWARD A THIRD SECTOR HOUSING
POLICY, (John Emmaus Davis ed., 1994) [hereinafter THE AFFORDABLE CITY].
121. The American system of mortgage financing places great emphasis on credit
history and down payments. Many families denied financing are wealthy enough to
own a home, and actually pay higher monthly rental payments than the potential
mortgage payment would be. Allan Mallach, The Legacy of Mt. LaureL" Maintaining
Affordability in New Jersey's Inclusionary Developments, in THE AFFORDABLE CITY,
supra note 120, at 226, 242 & n.23.
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lessness and shelter poverty in some urban areas.122 Transfer pay-
ments from the state or federal government are one solution to the
problem of buying power among the poor, to the extent one con-
siders this lack of buying power a problem. (In the same manner,
transfer payments from the state or federal government currently
magnify the buying power of better-off residents in the suburban
housing market, as discussed below.) In the affordable rental mar-
ket, such transfer payments include Section 8123 and, at least until
recently, Moving to Opportunity 124 housing vouchers. Yet the
political will to provide deep subsidies from public funds does not
exist.
A voluntary set-aside program creates precisely this subsidy, us-
ing market forces to transfer wealth to the poor from those people
who benefit most from the inefficiencies of the exclusionary re-
gime: suburban landowners and people who buy large lots. In
moving from a voluntary to a mandatory regime, the depth of that
wealth transfer increases dramatically, without any resulting loss in
the number of new homes built.
The mandatory set-aside program-Regime TWo-effectively re-
zones land, setting requirements on local governments and devel-
opers. The program has two parts. First, it forbids any
developments above a minimum size, unless the developer reserves
some of the units for moderate-income residents. Second, it gives
the developer a density bonus to help offset possible revenue losses
because of the inclusionary obligations.
The State of New Jersey and various counties in California have
adopted Regime TWo inclusionary programs. 125 New Jersey's Mt.
122. Shelter poverty is the condition of a person who is forced to pay out a large
portion of a small income in exchange for barely adequate housing services, leaving
little left for other necessities. See Aoki, supra note 27, at 817.
123. Section 8 is the major American housing subsidy, providing poor families with
housing vouchers redeemable anywhere within a certain set of communities. 42
U.S.C. § 1437 (1994).
124. The Moving to Opportunity Program (MOP) was intended to help a small
number of poor families move from high-poverty to low-poverty communities. See
Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 152, 106
Stat. 3672, 3716-17 (42 U.S.C. § 1437f note). Like the Section 8 program, for which
funding has consistently fallen, the MOP has come under attack in Congress. See 141
CONG. REC. S13,844 (statement of Sen. Mack) (describing proposed changes in Sec-
tion 8 voucher program); S. 1260, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 206(j) (1995) (proposing
repeal of the MOP).
125. See Laura M. Padilla, Reflections on Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed
Look at its Viability, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 539, 558-64 (1995). Certain counties in
California have used Regime Two plans since the middle 1970s, and California is cur-
rently contemplating a state-wide mandatory program along the same lines. Id.
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Laurel system, for example, targets new developments in commu-
nities that have little low-income housing. 126 Builders in these
communities must set aside one-tenth of the new units for moder-
ate-income use (50% to 80% of area median income) and one-
tenth for low-income use (less than 50% of area median income).
A proposed statewide program in California is more flexible and
allows each local government to conduct a feasibility study to de-
termine the number of inclusionary units that the local housing
market can support. 27 The California and New Jersey programs
each allow developers to concentrate inclusionary units in one part
of the development, to mix them in with more expensive stock, or
even to build them off-site. Inclusionary units may be identical to
more expensive units, or they may be smaller and less luxurious. 28
The regimes control resale price by means of a deed restriction on
each inclusionary unit.129
Like the set-aside, the density bonus can take a variety of forms.
Actually, "density" encompasses but a few of the possible changes.
Significant cost savings can result from the retraction of many ex-
clusionary zoning requirements: lot-size, square-footage threshold,
set-back distance, number of bedrooms, housing material, plumb-
ing standards, or the width of access roads and sidewalks.130 Addi-
tionally, "bonus" includes the non-use of the suburb's power to
proscribe even those projects that technically meet the letter of the
local zoning laws.' 3 ' In the analysis that follows, "density bonus"
must be read in a broad sense as any increase in the feasible
number of units (because of cost savings or otherwise) over the
number of units that the jurisdiction would otherwise allow. 132
126. The Mt. Laurel system has been codified as the New Jersey Fair Housing Act.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996). But see Rachel
Fox, The Selling Out of Mount Laurel: Regional Contribution Agreements in New
Jersey's Fair Housing Act, 16 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 572 (1988) (arguing that the Act
represents only a watered-down version of the Mt. Laurel court's mandate).
127. See Padilla, supra note 125, at 559.
128. Early drafts of the California proposal included a requirement that the inclu-
sionary units have the "exterior appearance" of full-price units. Padilla, supra note
125, at 562.
129. The deed restriction is sometimes necessary to keep the units in the affordable
stock. See Mallach, supra note 121, at 226-44.
130. Ellickson cites an Orange County ordinance that allows the developer to pick
any two of a long list of exceptions. Irony, supra note 5, at 1180.
131. The tendency of jurisdictions to stall certain development activity merely by
being uncooperative is, unfortunately, not quantifiable. Its economic effects parallel
those of other growth controls.
132. Naturally, recalcitrant jurisdictions need to be policed to ensure that bonuses
are given in practice as well as on paper.
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A similar type of Regime Two intervention, one that the State of
Oregon has used for the last twenty years, has the innocuous title
of "Growth Management." Under Oregon's plan, communities
near large cities have power to zone only within certain parameters
set by a state planning commission.133 The state commission re-
quires a part of the available residential space in each community
to be set aside for high-density use, often regardless of profitability.
A developer wishing to build must accept this mandatory density
bonus, or develop elsewhere. The Oregon system differs from
most California systems and the Mt. Laurel system in that it uses
density as a proxy for resident income and does not control the
resale price of the inclusionary stock. 34 Because the Oregon sys-
tem does not regulate who can live in the units it creates, it is more
similar to the builder's remedy than to other sorts of inclusionary
programs and does not provide a significant subsidy to the buying
power of the poor. The Oregon system, however, is a departure
from what would be the free market choice of developers. It re-
quires them to build more densely than they would like, and to
orient their production to a class of consumers whom they other-
wise would not serve.
1. Impact on the Supply of Housing
The critical fact about Regime Two is that its economic conse-
quences are identical to those of the voluntary set-aside program
whenever the builder profits from the density bonus. In the vast
majority of specific cases where mandatory programs have been
applied, developers have suffered no significant losses.' 35
The following section does not compare Regime Two to the sta-
tus quo of an exclusionary housing market, however. Regime One
133. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005-.860 (1995) (Comprehensive Land Use Plan-
ning Coordination). Washington has a state planning commission with similar pow-
ers. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.110 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997). Florida has an
informal system of encouraging local governments to comply with regional or state
growth plans. See generally Growth Management, supra note 14, at 1137-39, 1144
(recommending that other states adopt plans like Oregon's).
134. Nor does Oregon set price ceilings or income requirements on the original sale
of the units. Other growth management regimes might.
135. Most developers happily comply with Regime Two. New Jersey's Mt. Laurel
program has found no shortage of builder enthusiasm. See Growth Management,
supra note 14, at 1130 (N.J. actually relies on builders to enforce the fair-share sys-
tem); "NIMBY" REPORT, supra note 9 (mandatory programs can be a "bonus to de-
velopers"); Irony, supra note 5, at 1180 (density bonuses "reduce the construction
industry's political opposition"). But see id. at 1181 (citing a study commissioned by
the California Building Industry Association, which found that developers would suf-
fer losses under some contemporary California rules).
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showed the benefits of freeing developers from supply restrictions.
The following section shows the benefits of moving one step fur-
ther and forcing developers, whether they like it or not, to build at
higher densities. For this reason, the following section compares
the effects of Regime Two with a perfect voluntary set-aside pro-
gram (essentially a free market in housing). The goal is to show
what happens when a jurisdiction continues down the inclusionary
path and tries to squeeze as much subsidy as possible from subur-
ban market forces, even at the cost of slowing some types of luxury
construction.
Because it is a mandatory program, Regime Two may decrease
the developer's short-run revenue-both by limiting sale price and
by decreasing the exclusivity component of demand.136 This poten-
tial loss of revenue is why developers sometimes oppose inclusion-
ary programs as vociferously as existing homeowners. In turn, that
loss in revenue may jeopardize the commitment of certain produc-
tive factors and affect supply. If the supply effect is large enough,
the mandatory element of the inclusionary program can actually
decrease the number of homes built.
It is important, however, not to overestimate this danger. For
many reasons, only some of which an individual developer can pre-
dict, the drop in revenue may never occur. Furthermore, even if
revenue does fall, the move from a voluntary to a mandatory set-
aside program can still increase the stock of affordable housing by
encouraging denser (cheaper) development than market forces
alone ever could. The viability of the program, therefore, depends
on which of these two opposite effects-increased density of settle-
ment or the possibility of a general retraction in supply of produc-
tive factors-is likely to have a larger effect on the amount of
affordable homes produced.
a. Supply Effect I: Settlement Density
The first step in measuring the supply effects of mandatory set-
aside zoning is critical: choosing a measure of quantity. Ellickson
recognizes that mandatory set-aside rules increase development
density. 37 However, he sidesteps the economic consequences of
136. Irony, supra note 5, at 1181.
137. Id at 1180 ("Most inclusionary ordinances entitle an inclusionary developer to
build more dwelling units than the applicable zoning restrictions would otherwise al-
low. In other words, the inclusionary units may be, in whole or in part, add-on units
that the developer would not have been able to build in the absence of the inclusion-
ary program.").
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higher density by picking a particular-if not peculiar-definition
of the quantity of housing. Irony does not identify what "quantity"
means, but Ellickson does refer to "standard house equivalents.' 1 38
"Standard house equivalent" is a means by which "dwelling units
of various sizes and qualities can be aggregated together and dis-
cussed as a single market."' 39 Despite the name, "standard house
equivalents" are not a measure of the number or physical charac-
teristics of actual units. The term refers to the market value of
whatever construction occurs, regardless of the number or type of
constructed dwellings.' 40 As Ellickson says, "a shack might count
as one-quarter of a standard house equivalent, and a mansion as
six. "141 At the values given, therefore, the "quantity" of housing
decreases when twenty-three inexpensive homes are built instead
of one mansion.
The tautological market definition of quantity seems doubly in-
appropriate for the task of deciding how much affordable housing
an inclusionary program creates. First, the definition of quantity
has an obvious income bias-and housing is a good that most be-
lieve should be distributed with some sympathy for the poor. Sec-
ond, the market value definition of quantity is inappropriate
because the stated goals of national housing policy provide a clear
alternative: to increase the number of decent homes.
Ellickson, like most critics of inclusionary zoning, accepts this
premise as a' policy norm, but then ignores it in his economic analy-
sis.' 42 A standard that simply measures the number of decent units
has its own problem: it treats all livable homes as equal contribu-
tions to the national housing supply. This ignores differences in
size, location, luxury and age. A better system-conceivable, but
not necessary here-would combine the two measures. But gaug-
ing the quantity of housing services by number of units, at the very
least, avoids mistaking the bidding wars of the wealthy for positive
physical change.'43
138. Ellickson borrows the technique from Muth, supra note 95, at 32.
139. Growth Controls, supra note 18, at 393.
140. Muth, supra note 95, at 32.
141. Growth Controls, supra note 18, at 393.
142. It may be a legitimate law and economics position to claim that zoning rules
should maximize the sale value of new construction, but that goal directly contradicts
the stated purposes of inclusionary zoning rules. It cannot, therefore, be used to say
that inclusionary rules hurt those they seek to help.
143. The Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Department of Commerce still meas-
ures housing growth in terms of value. The practice is criticized by many economists.
The problem with this system of measurement is apparent whenever income effects or
local scarcity bid up housing prices. In the 1970s, for instance, the Bureau concluded
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Two examples show the problems of measuring the supply effects
of an inclusionary zoning program by yardstick of the market value
of the housing it creates. Assuming that a rule is passed that causes
triplexes, instead of mansions, to be built on two-acre lots, what
will happen to the "quantity" of housing? The answer is that quan-
tity will decrease, if a triplex, sells for less than the mansion, or
increase, if it sells for more. In an area where the wealthy can out-
bid the poor, mansions will sell for more. By the definition above,
then, the quantity of housing is said to decrease when a move is
made from one mansion to one triplex. That decrease occurs de-
spite the higher number of units, and despite the fact that the
triplexes use more productive inputs (with land use remaining con-
stant, but with, more construction hours going into an equally
priced triplex). Under such a system it is, by definition, improba-
ble that the construction of affordable housing will ever increase
supply.
Now Say we assume, holding everything else constant, that build-
ers discover a new way to run a multi-family sewer line and save
$1000 per unit in costs whenever they build multi-family housing.
These cost savings make builders more willing to supply multi-fam-
ily housing at a given price, and quantity increases. Given a nor-
mal demand curve, the price falls. But as the price falls-relative
to the type of housing for which the innovation wasn't applicable-
the quantity of standard house equivalents that the builders supply
falls as well. This discounting of the cost savings from type-specific
innovation is more than a theoretical fault. Higher-density build-
ing results in significant cost savings per unit-not only from the
use of less land, but also from economies of scale., These econo-
mies of scale are systematically trivialized by a measure of quantity
that gross investment in housing increased 2.8% per annum. Gross investment in-
cludes new construction, renovation and maintenance expenditures: in short, any pos-
itive contributions to the physical stock. The Bureau then concluded that net
investment in housing increased 2.9% per annum. Net investment is gross investment
minus demolition and depreciation. See POZDENA, supra note 87, at 38-39. How
could net investment be greater than gross investment? The answer lies in the in-
creased demand for housing generally-old and new-that raised the prices of all
units, even those not undergoing construction. Greater market demand translated
directly into greater "supply."
The political advantage of such a system of measurement during years of average
real income growth (but increasing income disparity) is obvious. Bidding wars among
the wealthy can have a supply effect even if physical growth is minimal; and the
stock's market value increases faster than its ability to provide housing services. The
annual rate of change in the net physical stock of housing units over the relevant time
period was only 2.2%, nearly 20% less than net "investment" of 2.9%. See id. at 39.
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that looks to price effect rather than the additional building activity
that the cost savings facilitate.
The recognition that the quantity of units per development in-
creases under inclusionary zoning rules calls into question Ellick-
son's statements about the efficacy of the filtering model.
Ellickson claims that the poor benefit equally from the construc-
tion of any given "standard house equivalent:'" 14
[F]iltering benefits ... tend to equal the benefits the less wealthy
would receive from new construction of moderate-income hous-
ing. Suppose that market forces at work in a city are leading to
the production of luxury housing on the city's few remaining va-
cant tracts. Nevertheless, the city arranges for the construction
of subsidized housing units on those sites. This might result in
some short-run benefits for moderate-income families. In the
long run, however, the city's provision of these low- and moder-
ate-income units would tend to reduce the number of similar
units produced through the filtering process. . . .[W]hatever
steps government takes to shape the quality mix of new housing
will tend to be offset in the long run by opposite changes in the
stock of used housing. 145
Ellickson's conclusion is wrong because it ignores the difference
between the supply of "standard house equivalents" and the quan-
tity of real units. If inclusionary units in the hypothetical city are
built at higher density than luxury units, then the city's policy can
influence the stock of affordable housing dramatically. The luxury
housing for which Ellickson argues would include fewer units, say
twenty mansions instead of forty cheap condominiums. Foregoing
the luxury housing will still result in the loss of twenty filter-vacan-
cies-but forty units will have been built instead. Measured in
units, the city's stock doubles!
Ellickson's approach would be justified if the switch from a low-
to high-density use was costless. If there were no conversion costs,
then a home worth $100,000 might provide the equivalent shelter
of two homes worth $50,000. But conversion costs are considera-
ble. In fact, the only way to transform most luxury, single-family
stock into multi-family housing is to raze it and start from
144. He is not alone: "The filter down process provides higher quality housing for
the poor than can be provided by construction of new houses for them." EDWIN S.
MILLS, URBAN ECONOMICS 123 (2d ed. 1980) (emphasis omitted). Fischel makes the
same mistake: "The growth that is allowed as a result of inclusionary zoning ... is
smaller than the increase in housing units that would have been obtained under zon-
ing that allowed only the usual single-family units." FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 329.
145. Irony, supra note 5, at 1187.
INCL USIONARY ZONING
scratch. 14 A stock of buildings built for the rich is of little help to a
nation that wants to house its poor. This point will be developed
later during the more detailed discussion of the filtering process in
the analysis of Regime Three. For now it is enough to recognize
that the filtering process, even when functioning perfectly, merely
allocates the housing stock-it cannot significantly change the char-
acter of the stock or the number of units that the stock can support.
Now that we have an appropriate definition of quantity, it is use-
ful to reconsider, in figures 4 and 5, Ellickson's analysis of the sup-
ply effects of an inclusionary zoning intervention, as reflected in his
original graphs. Ellickson says quantity moves to Q2, price to P2.
The new equilibrium point at E2 represents a dead weight loss cor-
responding to the triangle below El-E2.
The necessary change in the value of the x-axis, however, has
dramatic effects, even assuming that Ellickson's "tax" theory is le-
gitimate, as shown in figure 5. Quantity moves to Q3, price to P3.
The new equilibrium at E3 represents a dead weight gain corre-
sponding to the triangle below El-E3.147 The graph, of course, as-
sumes that the density bonus shifts the supply curve more to the
right than the "tax" shifted it to the left. Why any other result is
highly improbable is discussed immediately below.
b. Supply Effect II: Factor Exit?
The move from a voluntary program to Regime Two will cause
no bad, inward shift of the supply curve (El to E2 on Ellickson's
graph) unless the cost of providing the inclusionary units is greater
than the additional revenue that the developer is able to capture.
The increase in the density of settlement (and volume of units sold)
146. The doubling or tripling up of families is certainly possible (witness Boston),
but space and money are wasted by large homes unfit for their present uses. Econo-
mists make the distinction between the supply of housing structures ("stock") and the
supply of housing services ("flow"). Phrased in this language, stock built for the
wealthy cannot provide the services the poor need.
147. This is a little dishonest. The change results in dead weight gain only if one
posits that the demand curve does not fall. However, the demand curve will fall be-
cause of the higher density of settlement. Since we are comparing Regime Two to a
hypothetical market (as was Ellickson), the dead weight loss of the change in demand
should exceed the dead weight gain of the change in unit supply. Exactly how this
works is easy to conceptualize. The dead weight gain is reaped by the marginal buy-
ers and suppliers of new inclusionary units, as the graph depicts. The dead weight loss
is suffered by the consumers and producers who would otherwise buy and sell luxury
units-the inclusionary rule sets onerous conditions on the deal they otherwise would
have struck. The move from a free market (perfect voluntary set-aside program) to
Regime Two is therefore "inefficient," even though it increases the supply in terms of
the number of homes.
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Figure 4: Ellickson's Graph of Construction Tax Imposed
Without Perfect Substitutes
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Figure 5: Ellickson's Graph Revisited
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is itself a significant source of revenue. This increase drives the
voluntary set-aside program described above. However, a propo-
nent of a mandatory regime must address situations where the in-
clusionary units cannot be sold at a price that covers the current
costs of their construction. The difference between sales price and
cost of construction will vary with the market and the size of the
inclusionary "burden" that the jurisdiction chooses to impose.148
Whether the shortfall occurs, continues to occur, or causes the exit
of productive factors, depends on the following considerations.
(i) Costs of Construction
The significant cost savings of higher-density construction were
explained in the discussion of Regime One. If one assumes that
the market correctly evaluates the potential of these cost savings,
then the move from a voluntary set-aside program to a mandatory
set-aside one will not create cost savings greater than short-run
revenue losses. However, there are a few simple market-failure ar-
guments that suggest that the cost-savings created by the
mandatory regime may be greater than superficial analysis (or even
developer lobbying) suggests.
First, until now we have assumed that the developer is motivated
solely by the desire to maximize profits on the particular develop-
ment that he or she is considering. Such simple motivations are
seldom the entire story. Part of the developer's value on the mar-
ket is his or her reputation in the community and ability to deal
with local officials. If a developer decides to build low income
units in a traditionally highbrow neighborhood, the developer is
likely to lose the goodwill of officials who represent area residents,
decreasing the developer's ability to lure future buyers and win
concessions from the jurisdiction. The latter loss is particularly
devastating-even for developers who are not repeat players-be-
cause local jurisdictions have many ways to sap money from devel-
opers whose projects they do not like. The prospect of losing local
goodwill causes the rational developer to internalize part of the ille-
gitimate components of the Exclusivity Premium (including local
residents' cartel profits, tax advantages, and fears about potential
residents). There will be, therefore, a category of very profitable,
148. The revenue loss depends chiefly on the price of the inclusionary units. Ver-
sions of Regime Two that do not control the sale price of the units have an obvious
advantage.
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but very troublesome projects that the developer will not
attempt. 149
Second, we have looked at the developers' costs only at a spe-
cific time, and with existing techniques and technology. However,
multi-family housing construction is marked by a "learning-curve"
that may pay off exponentially as more developers are forced to
construct multi-family units, pooling technological and design gains
as they go. 150 The learning curve for multi-family development is
more significant than the learning curve for an equal amount of
single-family development. 15 1 The standard reply to this argument
says that the developers already understand the possibility of learn-
ing curve growth and predict costs accordingly. That reply ignores
the prisoner's dilemma inherent in the developers' situation. Even
if huge, industry-wide cost savings could be reaped by learning-
curve innovations, the individual developers would not invest ade-
quately in new solutions. The developer who decides to write off
costs as research and experimentation will reap only some of the
future benefits (a percentage equal to market share), but will have
paid the entire costs of discovery. Under those conditions, a group
of individual, rational developers will build according to existing
technology rather than move together to a more efficient level.' 52
If the assumption of pure profit motivation is dropped, the rut of
current development technology is deepened by habit, culture,
peer socialization, and the economics of small firm
specialization. 153
149. The cost of overcoming neighborhood opposition will still exist in an inclusion-
ary regime. The developer may be helped, however, by the fact that he or she did not
choose to build the new inclusionary units and is merely complying with the law.
150. Few construction firms have tried multi-family construction. Large builders
(the 18% of builders responsible for 80% of housing starts) build "virtually all" new
multi-family units. Robert H. Kuehn, Jr., The Homebuilding Industry: What Will it
Take to Produce More Affordable Housing? 20 (1988) (unpublished paper on file
with the MIT Center for Real Estate Dev.).
151. Multi-family dwelling happens in bigger buildings in more need of construc-
tion technology and design; it provides a huge range of possibilities for the synergistic
combination of living spaces.
152. Productivity growth in construction averages about 1.5% a year, well below
mean productivity growth in other industries. See POZDENA, supra note 87, at 55.
The construction industry, although large, is characterized by highly atomistic firms
and is extremely competitive. Basically good for consumers, this competitiveness
does make it difficult for the construction industry to fund and implement technologi-
cal and design advances.
153. Advances in cost savings might be spurred by public sector coordination of
research efforts. For current attempts at national coordination, see Affordable Hous-
ing and Construction R&D: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Env't. and Avia-
tion of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Tech., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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The long term costs of the "inclusionary burden" therefore are
mitigated by the proportion of supposed losses that are: (1) illusory
replacements for illegitimate costs of local goodwill; or (2) short
term costs that will disappear with the increased use of construc-
tion technology and good design.
(ii) Costs Passed on to Consumers
If Regime Two increases developers' costs, developers will try to
pass on part of their losses to buyers of non-inclusionary units. The
developers' ability to pass on costs depends on the elasticity of de-
mand. 154 When demand is elastic-i.e., there are a variety of alter-
native suburban sites offering comparably-priced homes, and
consumers are indifferent between the various suburbs-the devel-
oper will not be able to increase prices. However, when the com-
munity has special resources, access or charm, the developer will
be able to pass on almost the entire cost of the inclusionary rules.
In these jurisdictions, "stuck" home buyers suffer a loss in welfare,
but the developers will not lose money, and there will be little or
no negative change in the supply of housing. 55
One way to ensure inelastic demand is to impose Regime Two on
an entire metropolitan area, rather than just a few suburbs. De-
mand for larger areas is considerably less elastic than the demand
for smaller ones. A consumer with a taste for large lots can escape
a suburban price increase by moving to another suburb. A con-
sumer with a taste for large lots can escape a regional price in-
crease only by moving to another city, or buying less housing and
more other goods.' 56
(iii) Supply of Inputs
A Regime Two intervention that operates against an elastic de-
mand curve will force developers not operating at a substantial
profit to cut costs or exit. Developers can cut costs either by get-
ting more efficient, as discussed above, or by paying less for factors
of production. If developers in a jurisdiction are making large
154. The elasticity of demand can be broken into income and substitution effects.
The income effect refers to a home buyer's ability to pay. The substitution effect is a
buyer's readiness to purchase alternatives. Only the latter is affected by inclusionary
reform.
155. As explained below in the discussion of Regime Three, a price ceiling on the
inclusionary units and the resulting ability to price discriminate might increase profits
on non-inclusionary units enough to render the mandatory regime even more profita-
ble than the voluntary set-aside program.
156. See POZDENA, supra note 87, at 22-25.
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profits-which will mostly depend on entry barriers-the decrease
in revenue may simply be absorbed.157
Of the three main factors of production-builders, materials,
and land-the supply of land is least elastic.158 As the suppliers of
the least elastic factor of production, land owners will pay the lion's
share of whatever supply-side losses the inclusionary system cre-
ates.159 When bidding on land, developers will lower their bids to
adjust for the costs of inclusionary obligations. 60 Landowners, un-
less they can orchestrate a collective holdout, will be forced to sell
at the offered price or find some other use.' 6 ' A decrease in the
supply of land will be unlikely, given the inelasticity of the supply
curve for land, and the relatively small burden imposed by the typi-
cal inclusionary regime. 62
c. Aggregating the Supply Effects
The move from a voluntary program to Regime TPwo will de-
crease the number of units in the housing stock only when the
stock gains caused by higher settlement density are outweighed by
the stock losses caused by factorexit. Factor exit will occur only if
the developers can neither absorb costs nor pass them on to con-
157. The building industry as a whole is not characterized by significant entry barri-
ers according to Muth, supra note 95, at 44-45 (construction firms are not character-
ized by highly cyclical profits; entry is easier than in most other industries). Particular
builders with local connections, however, may be able to carve themselves a protected
niche. Cf. MALLACH, supra note 7, at 94 (describing the limits on developer's in-
terjurisdictional mobility). Generally, profits are volatile and the development busi-
ness is risky. Id. at 87.
158. Ellickson's economic analysis assumes that all supply factors besides land are
perfectly elastic, but that the supply of land is "neither infinitely elastic (because sites
are limited), nor infinitely inelastic (because landowners can' use their land for farm-
ing or other nonhousing uses)." Irony, supra note 5, at 1188 n.94. See also Growth
Controls, supra note 16, at 401.
159. Landowners do not take any significant costs into account when deciding how
much land to "produce"-their profits are pure economic rent. The price they can
command is determined by strategic and speculative market behavior-and their
power in this regard is limited by the difficulties of price coordination, the existence of
alternative areas, and the developer's ability to substitute improvements for land. See
POZDENA, supra note 87, at 50-52.
160. Irony, supra note 5, at 1190.
161. Other possible alternative uses are unlikely to be as commonly demanded (in-
dustry) or as profitable (learning to ride horses).
162. One author fine-tunes the standard analysis by presenting two types of juris-
dictions. In the first, the supply of developable land is in only a few hands. The small
group of landholders may be in a position to avoid pass-through by coordinating their
bidding behavior. In the second type of jurisdiction, landholders are many-or the
developers themselves have acquired reserves of land-and the developer will be able
to pass-through costs almost at will. See MALLACH, supra note 7, at 90.
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sumers or landowners. The tendency to overestimate the costs of
inclusion, the possibility of elastic demand, and the near certainty
of inelastic supply of land all indicate that situations where stock
loss is greater than stock gain will be extremely rare. Even when
such a danger exists, Regime TWo can adjust by fine-tuning the fol-
lowing variables: (1) the ratio of inclusionary to non-inclusionary
units; (2) the size of the density bonus; (3) the existence and level
of. price controls; and (4) the scale of intervention (regional vs. lo-
cal). Any area with reasonably strong demand should be able to
ensure gains in the housing stock by manipulating these variables
appropriately. 163
The only real risk that the move from a voluntary to a
mandatory program will harm the housing market arises from a
possible drop in consumer demand. High density units may cause
a decline in the desirability of the suburb among wealthier buyers.
As mentioned above, this problem is only significant if the inclusio-
nary rules are very unpopular among wealthy buyers and apply to
few jurisdictions in the suburban area. If Regime Two is passed for
an entire region, the drop in the Exclusivity Premium should have
less effect on price. In any event, developers can mitigate the loss
of the Exclusivity Premium by good design or by segregating the
development into high and low density areas. If all of these safe-
guards fail, the region can simply relax the inclusionary obligations
or move toward a voluntary system-without having suffered any
long term loss as a result of its experimentation.
A similar problem might develop if the price ceiling is set too
low to adequately cover the costs that the developer cannot pass
through. 164 The price ceiling's permissible height-or the market
price of the inclusionary units under a system without price con-
trols-depends on the buying power of the target population.165 If
buying power is inadequate, one solution is to secure public fund-
ing to account for the difference between the target population's
ability to pay and the minimal total revenue needed to avoid the
163. I assume that the manipulator is reasonably capable, and motivated by re-
gional, rather than purely parochial, concerns.
164. If we hypothesize that the pre-inclusionary market was at equilibrium and the
supply curve is not sticky, the quantity of housing demanded is inadequate to support
the current level of production inputs whenever the inclusionary regime curtails any
of the developer's total revenue. The question here is different, however. We are
concerned with whether demand is adequate to keep the exit of supply factors from
offsetting most or all of the gains from higher settlement density.
165. The elasticity of demand among the poor, like the elasticity of demand among
the wealthy, has price and income elements.
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exit of productive factors. The other solution is to raise or elimi-
nate the price ceiling. In this regard, the major criticism of inclu-
sionary programs that do not set price controls-that they help
middle-income persons directly and the poor only through filter-
ing-is a strength. By targeting the middle-income as potential
buyers, such programs avoid revenue problems and still increase
the total stock.
2. Winners and Losers Under Regime Two
a. Existing Homeowners
Under the voluntary set-aside program, existing homeowners
lost part of their Exclusivity Premium. In the move from the vol-
untary set-aside program to Regime TWo, they will lose more of it
if Regime Two results in a greater number of units, or units for
persons with lower incomes.
The move from the voluntary set-aside program to Regime Two
can decrease or increase the cartel profits of existing homeowners.
On the one hand, mandatory high density construction will cause a
general increase in the number of units on the market. On the
other hand, the new stock will be of a type that may not compete
directly with existing homes.166 If the inclusionary burden is large,
or there is factor exit, the number of competing new units could
decrease-even as the number of total units rises. The resulting
lack of competing houses would raise the resale value of the ex-
isting homes in jurisdictions where demand is somewhat elastic (es-
pecially if Regime Two is imposed on an entire region).
This ability to capture cartel rent is one reason why homeowners
in areas where the demand curve is very inelastic sometimes favor
mandatory set-aside programs, even while vigorously opposing vol-
untary ones. Such homeowners may see their property values rise
under Regime Two, even if they are not especially fond of their
new neighbors. On the other hand, in areas where the Exclusivity
Premium is high but the demand curve is elastic because of substi-
tutes, homeowners will resist both Regime One and Regime Two.
Such homeowners will suffer the loss of Exclusivity Premium but
will not have the market power to reap cartel profits from a restric-
tion of competing new construction. As a general matter, there-
fore, one can expect that homeowners (to the extent they worry
about the resale value of their home) will offer less resistance to a
166. Assuming there is some difference in taste between high-end and low-end
purchasers.
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regional inclusionary zoning intervention than to a local one, be-
cause a regional intervention promises a less elastic demand curve.
b. Owners of Undeveloped Land
Under a voluntary set-aside program, owners of undeveloped
land benefitted when more efficient use of their fixed resource
brought higher prices. Under Regime Two, their welfare depends
on how much of the inclusionary activity is actually profitable. If
the developer's total revenue falls (because costs are high and/or
demand elastic), the owners of undeveloped land will see a drop in
price. The landowners will be able to resist the drop in price only if
they are highly organized or if industrial, agricultural, or recrea-
tional uses are extremely profitable. In most areas, landowners
will bear the brunt of any drop in developer revenue. For this rea-
son, one can expect landowners to favor a move from an exclusion-
ary system to the voluntary set-aside program, but to resist the
move from a voluntary to a mandatory program (which means that
their interests are precisely opposite those of homeowners in com-
munities without market substitutes).
c. Buyers of Non-Inclusionary Units
Under the voluntary set-aside program, buyers with preferences
for large lots saw a slight increase in prices because their tastes for
space were no longer subsidized by large-lot zoning. To the extent
that demand is inelastic, their situation is considerably worse under
Regime Two. If demand is inelastic (because the community has
special characteristics or the intervention affects an entire region)
the price of large lots will likely rise as developers pass on to mar-
ket consumers the cost of building inclusionary units (to the extent
such cost is not borne by land owners). Even if the price of large
lots falls or remains the same (because the shift in demand caused
by loss of the Exclusivity Premium has a bigger price effect than
the drop in supply), large lot buyers lose some of the Exclusivity
Premium that otherwise would come with a new home.
If demand is elastic and the intervention local, buyers should
break even. The bargaining position of the buyers will force devel-
opers to pass losses on to land owners, or to absorb the losses
themselves. The price of new homes may fall because of lost Ex-
clusivity Premium, but that substitution has not made the buyers
better off because the buyers receive less for their money (i.e., less
Exclusivity Premium). It is true that communities with elastic de-
mand curves face the possibility that land owners or developers
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will exit. Exit on the supply side would mean an increase in prices.
However, if demand is truly inelastic, the extent of exit and the
magnitude of the resulting price change will be minimal.,
The situation is more complex and interesting if non-inclusionary
buyers in an elastic market are divided into groups, according to
their subjective valuations of the second (prestige/prejudice) com-
ponent of the Exclusivity Premium.167 Buyers whose subjective
valuations of exclusiveness are greater than the market's (roughly
the average) are losers under Regime Two, because the drop in
exclusivity is more important to them than the drop in price. On
the other hand, buyers whose subjective Valuations of exclusiveness
are less than the market's are winners, because' the drop in price is
more important to them than the drop in exclusivity. Regime Two,
imposed under conditions of an elastic demand curve, thus repre-
sents a transfer of wealth-and I mean this quite seriously-from
snobs and racists to the more open-minded.
d. Buyers of Inclusionary Units
Obviously, those who receive inclusionary units benefit in the
same manner as under the voluntary set-aside program. However,
the number of set-aside units will likely be larger under the
mandatory regime, because some part of the value of developable
land or the demand for large lots is used as a source of subsidy to
low income residents. Thus, the program will be able to benefit a
greater number of the poor, or provide the same number of poor
with a deeper subsidy. Of course, like the voluntary set-aside pro-
gram, the mandatory program is open to the criticism that it gives
an in-kind subsidy rather than cash.
A regime without price controls, like Oregon's growth manage-
ment regime, avoids the in-kind subsidy problem. The price of the
inclusionary units can be as high as market demand allows. 168 The
hybrid, however, is not as helpful to poorer consumers. First, the
wealth transfer it creates will be slight unless the government pro-
167. A similar method might divide buyers, according to the first prong of the Ex-
clusivity Premium, based upon how much they stand to gain from high levels of public
expenditure.
168. Why the hybrid avoids criticism as Kaldor-Hicks inefficient is more a matter of
economic culture than logic. Technically, the hybrid is also inefficient if the market
value of the parcel at high-density is less than the market value of the parcel at low-
density. The high-density users would like to sell the power to determine density to
wealthier buyers, taking a portion of the wealthy buyers' surplus, but the rule change
to high-density forbids such transactions. Forbidding the transaction might be
Kaldor-Hicks efficient if persons other than the parties to the transaction would be
harmed; the same can be said for the in-kind subsidy.
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vides significant subsidies. Second, the units will be purchased by
buyers with moderate incomes, and the poor will be helped only
indirectly, through filtering. Finally, if not imposed on the entire
jurisdiction, the hybrid risks falling victim to its own success-an
increase in affordable housing can lure buyers from other places,
and possibly bid up prices to their pre-intervention level.
e. Public Administrative Costs
There are two types of administratiye costs generated by Regime
Two. First, a government agency, usually the state or regional gov-
ernment, must develop a plan, and ensure that local jurisdictions
and developers implement it faithfully. Monitoring has not proven
difficult, largely because some local party is usually angry enough
to bring a potential violation to the attention of the regional organ-
ization. More time and effort has been spent arguing about the
appropriate level of inclusionary obligations, and remedies for its
disregard. 169
If the system imposes price controls on the inclusionary units,
there are additional monitoring costs. Typically, Regime Two in-
terventions set up organizations to control the resale price, and re-
cover windfall profits at the end of the price-ceiling period. The
costs of running these organizations, which are not excessive, 70 can
be covered during times of increasing housing prices, by appropria-
tion of a percentage of the resale profits.17
3. Effects of Regime Two: Running Summary
The move from Regime One to Regime To-and from a volun-
tary to a mandatory program generally-will increase the number
of affordable units in the housing stock whenever the inclusionary
obligations of the developer are not extreme and there is adequate
demand for high density housing. Although total developer reve-
nue may decrease, little of this loss will be borne by the developers
themselves. The developers will shift the new costs to two groups
of people, in amounts that depend upon the elasticities of con-
sumer demand and the supply of land. Buyers of non-inclusionary
units may pay more and/or get less. Owners of undeveloped land
169. The political history of New Jersey's inclusionary zoning system is described
generally in Fox, supra note 126.
170. The New Jersey resale control process is run by one full-time manager with
part-time secretarial support at an annual cost of $60,000 (about $100 per annum per
inclusionary unit). Mallach, supra note 121, at 232.
171. Id at 232-39.
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may see a drop in sale price. As long as developer revenue does
not fall too far, neither of these costs will lead to a significant re-
traction of supply. Dangerous drops in total revenue appear likely
only when programs insist on setting a low income ceiling, and do
not provide adequate public subsidies to make production of the
inclusionary units profitable.
"Growth Management" systems that do not impose price con-
trols on the inclusionary units will have a smaller negative effect on
builder revenue, regardless of the elasticity of the demand curves.
Such regimes are an excellent method of increasing the total hous-
ing stock in jurisdictions where demand among the class of people
that the program seeks to help is fairly strong. However, a regime
without price controls cannot effectively redistribute wealth. Nor
can it target a particular income group. For Ellickson, this short-
coming defeats the purpose of such inclusionary regimes which
cannot directly provide housing for the very poor.172 What he
misses is the increased filtering of units to the poor brought about
by: (1) the shortening of the filter chain as moderate-income fami-
lies (rather than wealthy ones) move into new units; and (2) the
increased density of construction, which creates more units, and
units of a type more useful to the poor.
C. Regime Three: Mandatory Set-Asides Without Density
Bonuses
Regime Three looks like a housing economist's nightmare. It re-
quires developers to set aside a percentage of any new develop-
ment for rent or sale at a fixed price, but gives them no density
bonuses or other concessions. There is no per-unit cost savings,
only an obvious loss in revenue. The supply curve should move in
only one direction: back. The price of non-inclusionary housing
should increase. Factors of production should exit. The inclusion-
ary tenants should overconsume housing and depart from Pareto
optimality. And huge surpluses should be bestowed on a random
collection of happy, low-income winners, while the majority of the
poor sink deeper into shelter poverty.
No jurisdiction has ever tried to implement Regime Three. 73
Yet Regime Three, because there is no change in density, is exactly
the scenario in which Ellickson's analysis would best apply. The
172. Irony, supra note 5, at 1192-94.
173. There is the possibility that an unmonitored jurisdiction that says it is applying
Regime Two may, by not actually giving density bonuses, in effect be applying Regime
Three.
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final section below examines this hypothetical nightmare regime,
and shows that even it can increase the stock of affordable housing.
The economic effects of Regime Three will also shed light on key
elements of the previous two regimes, mentioned earlier, but not
fully described: price discrimination and Filter Loss. These two
factors are at work in any inclusionary program, and help explain
why inclusionary programs are far more efficacious than law and
economics has thought. Like the section about Regime Two, the
following section compares Regime Three to a free market in
housing.
1. Impacts on Low Income Housing Stock
Regime Three is not "efficient" according to any classic micro-
economic test. However, the main criticism of Regime Three, that
it hurts the very persons whom it intends to help, is not supporta-
ble. In most markets, Regime Three can provide more affordable
housing than a system allocating new units to the highest bidder.
a. A Housing Supply Equation
Pre-intervention, the growth in the stock of affordable housing
depends on the number of new, market-rate units, and how many
of these units filter down to reach the target population. 174 After a
Regime Three intervention, the growth in the stock of affordable
housing comes from two sources. One source continues to be new
market stock that filters down. The amount of new market stock is
likely to be less than that built before the intervention because de-
velopers must bear the cost of the inclusionary units. The other
source of affordable stock is the set-aside.
For any mandatory inclusionary program trying to help the poor,
the crucial question is whether the loss in filtered-down market
stock will be bigger or smaller than the set-aside. For the mathe-
matically inclined, the question can be phrased as an equation.
(AP * 1lS) * f + S <?> 0
AP is percentage change in average sale price of new units, includ-
ing both inclusionary and market-rate units. The reader can as-
sume (momentarily) that the change is negative (average price
falls). rS is the price elasticity of supply of new units, or the slope
of the supply curve. It is the long-run response (measured in
change in number of units actually built) to the loss in short-run
174. The new housing itself doesn't actually filter; it simply causes filter moves. But
the image is useful.
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revenue, AP.175 f is the Filter Rate, the chance that an additional
unit of new market stock will result in an equivalent gain in stock
available to the target population. S represents the number of
units in the set-aside.
The equation is easy to apply. If the intervention decreases
builder revenue by 20%, and the price elasticity of supply is 0.5,
then the number of new luxury units built will decrease by 10%.
Imagine that means 900 units are built instead of 1000, resulting in
a loss of 100 units. If the Filter Rate is 0.8 (such that 80% of stock
growth translates into stock growth for the target population), then
80 units have been lost. If the set-aside priovides more than 80
units, the intervention is warranted. If it provides fewer than 80,
the intervention is not. Of course, these numbers are only hypo-
thetical. If the drop in builder revenue is 40%, then 200 luxury
units will be lost, 160 of which would have benefitted the poor.
This means that the set-aside (S,) must be larger than 160 for the
intervention to make sense.
The jurisdiction implementing the Regime Three program picks
the exact size of the set-aside (S). The values of the other three
variables (AP, rilS, and f) are more difficult to determine in a given
situation. This difficulty does not mean that Regime Three is inad-
visable in most circumstances. On the contrary, there is an easily
discernible class of situations in which Regime Three will almost
always increase the supply of affordable homes. The following
analysis identifies these circumstances, and shows that the precon-
ditions for a successful Regime Three intervention are surprisingly
common.
b. Causes and Magnitude of Supply Shift (AP * riS)
(i) Developer's Short-Run Revenue (AP)
Since Regime Three holds density per development constant, it
will shift back the supply curve, regardless of how supply is mea-
sured, if it decreases the total revenue of developers. That result is
by no means certain-and there are situations in which the oppo-
site may occur. At the very least, Ellickson has not taken into ac-
count one factor that mitigates the builders' losses in all
jurisdictions where demand is not perfectly elastic: price
discrimination.
175. Actually, to make the terms work, the price elasticity of supply must be multi-
plied by the number of units built before the intervention. Calling the pre-interven-
tion supply S, the more accurate equation is: (AP * iiS * S) * f + Si <?> 0.
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The change in developers' revenue at a fixed level of production
depends on only three factors. Two are controlled by the jurisdic-
tion: the proportion of inclusionary to market-price units, and the
price of the inclusionary units. The third factor is beyond the juris-
diction's control-but nevertheless predictable: the slope of the to-
tal demand curve for residential units in the jurisdiction. The
change in developers' revenue is illustrated by the three graphs
which follow. The graphs depict total, short-run revenue from the
market-price units (figure 6), the inclusionary units (figure 7), and
all units together (figure 8).176
In this series of graphs, P* and Q* are the original levels of price
and supply; P1 and Q1 are the price and supply of market-price
units under Regime Three. As figure 6 shows, the effect of Regime
Three on total builder revenue may not be as simple as Ellickson
or others present it, at least in the short run. On the one hand, the
black rectangle (lower right) represents a loss in revenue. This loss
results from the decrease in total volume of market price units
sold. On the other hand, the medium grey rectangle (upper left),
represents gain in revenue. This gain results from the developer's
ability to raise unit price as the quantity sold decreases (by Q*-Q1).
It is important to realize that this revenue gain could not be
achieved under a voluntary regime unless the builders were able to
coordinate price discrimination.177
Whether the rectangle representing revenue loss is bigger than
the rectangle representing revenue gain (or vice-versa) will depend
on the slope of the demand curve between the relevant points (Q1,
P1 and Q*, P*). If demand is elastic (the jurisdiction has no special
characteristics that relevant consumers value and there are an un-
limited number of equally expensive alternative sites), then the
black rectangle representing loss will be large, and the medium
grey rectangle representing gain small. Obviously, the builder will
lose revenue in such cases. If demand is inelastic (the jurisdiction
has special characteristics that relevant consumers value and/or
176. These graphs depict builder revenue in the short-run-before suppliers have
time to adjust their behavior to account for the revenue change.
177. Of course, residential developers can always price discriminate by differentiat-
ing units and bargaining with individual customers. However, price discrimination by
product differentiation or bargaining is costly and inaccurate.
Perhaps more importantly, developers cannot enforce any agreement about price
discrimination with the same efficacy as a mandatory set-aside zoning regime. With-
out perfect trust among developers, product differentiation will not lead to profit cap-
ture-prices above the cost of differentiation-because of competition among
developers (i.e., "cheating" will gradually decrease the price of the differentiated
product).
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Figure 6: Builder's Revenue from Non-Inclusionary Units
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there is a scarcity of similarly priced alternative sites), then the rec-
tangle representing loss will be small and the rectangle represent-
ing gain will be large.
The implication of this analysis to the way in which laymen and
legal economists like Ellickson view Regime Three is unsettling: in
areas with inelastic demand for housing, developers may enjoy an
increase in total revenue from the imposition of a mandatory regime,
even if that regime grants no density bonus. This revenue gain could
not be achieved by developers acting independently. In fact, it is
unlikely that isolated developers, faced with an inclusionary zoning
proposal, could even predict the full possibility of the gain. To
favor such a proposal, developers would have to be sophisticated
enough to see the benefits of region-wide price discrimination, and
trusting enough to allow the government to coordinate it.
Figure 6 assumed that the units disappear if they can no longer
be sold at market price. Obviously, that is not the case. The devel-
opers make some revenue from the sale of the inclusionary units.
That revenue is represented in figure 7. Here, Pi represents the
price ceiling on the inclusionary units set by the local jurisdiction.
The level of this ceiling can be chosen by the jurisdiction, but it is
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Figure 7: Builders' Revenue From Price-Controlled Units
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limited by the ability of the target residents to pay. 178 The number
of set-asides-S,--is represented by O-Q*. By definition, this
number equals the number of units of volume "lost" in figure 7.
The total effect on builder revenue is the sum of the two graphs,
which is depicted in figure 8. Part of the loss represented by the
black rectangle has been offset by the revenue from the price con-
trolled units. Notice that now, given our hypothetical demand
curve, the area of the black rectangle representing loss is approxi-
mately equal to the area of the medium grey rectangle representing
gain. Profits, therefore, remain steady. 179  There has been no de-
crease in revenue, despite the fact that the individual inclusionary
units are sold for less than their cost of production. In this respect,
the jurisdiction's help in raising prices for the non-inclusionary
units under Regime Three serves a similar purpose as the jurisdic-
tion's ability to grant density bonuses under Regime Two: the
otherwise illegal revenue gains help offset possible marginal losses
that developers suffer in building the inclusionary units. In the hy-
178. In most regimes the situation is slightly more complex. The residents of the
inclusionary units pay an amount greater than Pi, but the builders receive only Pi.
The difference goes to defer the costs of running the price-control system.
179. Of course, the inclusion of low income home buyers may cause demand to
shift backwards slightly because part of the Exclusivity Premium is lost.
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Figure 8: Total Short-Term Builder Revenue Change
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pothetical case with the above values for price and supply elastic-
ity, there is no decrease in the return to any productive factor (AP
= 0). In other cases, revenue may fall or rise, depending on
elasticity.
(ii) Effect of Short-Run Revenue on Supply
(A) Effect of Decreasing Returns
Gradually, given the various assumptions of perfect competition,
a decrease in total revenue will shift the supply curve backwards,
decreasing quantity. The shift will continue until the revenue loss
has been absorbed. Without costs savings by the. developer, the
supply curve will shift until the area of the rectangle representing
revenue gain equals the area of the ,rectangle representing revenue
loss. The two graphs in figures 9 and 10 show how short-term
losses affect long-term quantity. Here, the supply curve shifts
backwards from the old equilibrium (Q*) until the areas of the
black loss and medium grey gain rectangles are equal. The market
price of non-inclusionary units moves quickly up to P1, and then
continues to climb gradually until it reaches P2. The quantity of
non-inclusionary units settles at Q2. The number of inclusionary
units, of course, remains the same. Total quantity has fallen to QT
(i.e., Q*-QT = - (AP * ijS)).
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(B) Effect of Increasing Revenues
If demand is inelastic enough, gains from price discrimination
will outweigh losses from construction of the inclusionary units.
Developer revenue will then increase, as the jurisdiction allows the
developers to act as a state-sanctioned cartel. These ensuing stages
of the Regime Three inclusionary zoning model are shown in
figures 11 and 12. Here the gain in total developer revenue pushes
the supply curve outward along the steeply sloping demand curve
until the two rectangles are equal. Increased supply represents
more output by existing developers and/or new entry. The price of
non-inclusionary housing moves to P2; total quantity, to QT (i.e.,
Q*-QT = AP * qS).
(iii) Revenue and Regime Three's Goals
If Regime Three increases, or simply does not affect, builder rev-
enue, then there is no need to look further. Regime Three will
increase the supply of affordable housing and the supply of housing
generally.180 If builder revenue does decrease (i.e., AP * T1S < 0),
then less new stock will be built. The filtering rate should then be
examined to determine if the lost market-rate stock would have
helped the target population more than the set-aside. If revenues
may fall, determining the Filter Rate becomes critical for the zon-
ing policy planner.
c. Determining the Filter Rate (f)
According to the filter theory, the construction of 100 market-
rate units will increase the supply of affordable housing by 100
units-no matter what the market-rate, and no matter what defini-
tion we give to the term "affordable." The worst 100 units on the
market will either be bought by current home-renters (or the
homeless), or abandoned."" Empirically, however, these results
never occur. The translation of the filtering process from theory to
reality (or from theory to better theory) involves the introduction
of distance-spatial and temporal-between new units and their
target population. Distance between the construction and "re-
ceipt" of a unit creates attrition. Housing economists have other
words for the same phenomenon. The physical units are called
"stock." The ability of those units to shelter residents is called
180. If P > 0 ; then (AP * rjS) * f + Si > 0 (because the elasticity of supply, the
Filter Rate, and the set aside (ilS, fand Si, respectively) are always positive numbers).
181. See generally HOusING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 161-203
(Roger Montgomery & Daniel R. Mandelker eds., 2d ed. 1979).
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Figure 9: Revenue and Supply (Short-Term)
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"services." As time passes, the capacity of the stock to provide
services changes, usually decreasing. Stock capacity changes be-
cause of physical deterioration and changes in the value of the
units' neighborhood.18 2 The speed of change is influenced by the
original physical characteristics of the stock and the level of
maintenance' 83
When judging the filtering effects of new construction vis-A-vis a
target population of expected recipients, it is more useful to speak
of the Filter Rate. The Filter Rate can be defined as the percent-
age of new investment in physical housing stock that translates into
actual benefits in physical housing services enjoyed by the target
population. It corresponds to the practical question: How much
does constructing X units for the wealthy actually help the poor?
Filter Loss is one minus the Filter Rate (1-f).
(i) Causes of Filter Loss
The advisability of a Regime Three intervention depends, in
part, on the total Filter Loss for the market-rate units that would
182. See POZDENA, supra note 87, at 43-44.
183. Id.
i!! i ! , ,, :%i! !! , ,: i i
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Figure 10: Revenue and Supply (Long-Term)
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otherwise be built. To explain why Filter Loss occurs, however, it
is necessary to be more reductionist-for total Filter Loss is the
sum of thousands of little failures. Some correspond to market
failures as traditionally understood; others, because the poor are
simply outbid, are efficient transactions between the two parties.)8
The first and greatest cause of Filter Loss is time. The rate of
stock deterioration changes with the level of maintenance expendi-
ture, and the necessary level of maintenance expenditures in-
creases as a unit gets older. Accelerating deterioration results in
many affordable rental units where tenant rents do not cover nec-
essary upkeep. Once a critical threshold is reached, it becomes
cheaper for the landlord to "milk" the building-collecting rents
but spending zero dollars on upkeep. Milked units quickly become
uninhabitable-lowering the sale value of other homes in the trou-
bled neighborhoods and causing more landlord exit.1 85 People
with more money for maintenance might have saved these older
units, and the low income residents who watched helplessly as they
184. Even transactions that are Kaldor-Hicks efficient are treated as Fdter Loss
because of the goal of the inclusionary regime to increase the number of affordable
units (and the claim by its opponents that it cannot).
185. See Kennedy, supra note 28, at 489-97.
1996]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIV
Figure 11: Revenue and Supply (Short-Term)
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were destroyed might have done fine in newer units with fewer
running costs. 186 Ironically, the filter theory of housing seeks to
effect the opposite situation: those with money for maintenance
live in units that do not need it; those whose homes need mainte-
nance have no money.
Second, Filter Loss occurs when political, social, cultural, geo-
graphic, or racial barriers separate stock from potential buyers.
These barriers can be seen as transaction costs, even though they
sometimes make transactions illegal rather than just inconvenient.
Federal Section 8 or Moving to Opportunity voucher holders have
been legally forbidden from redeeming their coupons in many sub-
urban jurisdictions. 187 Private realtors may not advertise homes in
media to which persons living anywhere in the region have access.
Banks may refuse to extend credit. Racism plays several different
roles: making buyers and potential neighbors afraid, and creating
186. See MALLACH, supra note 7, at 47.
187. See Paula Beck, Fighting Section 8 Discrimination: The Fair Housing Act's New
Frontier, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155 (1996); Philip D. Tegeler, Housing Segrega-
tion and Local Discretion, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 209 (1994).
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Figure 12: Revenue and Supply (Long-Term)
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racially-identified boundaries that sale or lease transactions do not
cross. 
1 88
Third, Filter Loss occurs because the markets for rental and
ownership units in America are distinct. Market separation results
from the disparity between tenant and owner preferences for phys-
ical housing types. Although it is possible for owners to move units
between the rental and ownership markets, such moves are costly,
especially for multi-family housing. 89 Market separation is exacer-
bated by barriers to home ownership. One such barrier is income
differentials between owners and renters. 90 Another barrier is er-
ected by strict mortgage financing rules (usually decided by private
188. See generally Ford, supra note 2.
189. For single-family homes switching is common (although demand for rental
units is minimal because of the tax benefits of ownership). For.large, multi-family
apartment complexes the switch may involve a rather, costly legal process. See U.S.
DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URB. DEV., THE CONVERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING TO
CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES (1980). Moreover, because of the difference in
tastes and income between rental and ownership markets, the switch requires consid-
erable new investment.
190. Eighty-eight percent of all renters cannot afford the median-priced home.
Multifamily Housing Finance and Production: Hearings, supra note 20, at 35.
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lenders) that confine consumers with certain traits to the rental
market-even though they may have the income necessary to
make mortgage payments. 191 The exact degree of market segmen-
tation is contested. Strong evidence of segmentation is the fact
that changes in the price of rental stock do not track changes in the
price of ownership stock.192
Fourth, Filter Loss is caused by the physical characteristics and
location of stock. Stock built for the wealthy is a poor provider of
housing services to the poor. The physical traits of the stock may
be suited only to low-density use: large rooms, large yards, not
enough bedrooms, etc. Unless such units are renovated, they are
of little help to persons who need affordable housing.193 Further-
more, even if the unit is physically capable of filtering, the location
of the housing stock can discourage purchase by low-income buy-
ers. Although the wealthy can afford to pay higher transportation
expenses, and certainly are not dependent on public transporta-
tion, housing stock far away from jobs is largely unusable to poor
persons who are actively seeking work. 94 Stock in the middle of a
city may also become unusable-or at least, less capable of provid-
ing housing services-because of neighborhood effects and cycles
of disinvestment. 95
191. MALLACH, supra note 7, at 73-75 (a bad credit history or the absence of a
down payment precludes most renters from ever becoming owners).
192. See POZDENA, supra note 87, at 80. Much of the discrepancy can be explained
by the differing motivations of buyers and renters. Rental prices include only the
price of housing services. Ownership prices include the price of housing services and
the price of a favorably-taxed investment. Rental prices are largely determined by
demand and physical stock supply. Ownership prices vary with interest rates, tax pol-
icy, and expectations of future wealth. An exacting analysis of the Filter Rate of own-
ership stock to poor renters would require a disentangling of the many reasons why
people buy homes.
193. Even when such conversions are attempted, they are often done illegally, with
sometimes chaotic results. See, e.g., Frank Bruni & Deborah Sontag, Behind a Subur-
ban Facade in Queens, A Teeming, Angry Urban Arithmetic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1996,
at Al (reporting on how a combination of "stubborn poverty" and the dwindling sup-
ply of affordable housing in the New York City metropolitan area has led to a surge in
illegal apartments in Queens, a borough "that once fancied itself the tranquil gateway
to Long Island").
194. Cf James Dao, Welfare Rules Created for Cities Cause Trouble in the Country-
side, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1995, at Al & B4 (commenting on the New York state rules
which limit the value of vehicles owned by welfare recipients, thereby eliminating
dependable transportation to jobs for poor persons who reside in areas of the state
not served by public buses).
195. See Wilson, supra note 4, at 9-11. One might point out that filtering has left
certain areas of the Bronx, within the borders of America's largest city and most ex-
pensive regional housing market, an uninhabited ruins.
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Fifth, demographic change can cause dramatic Filter Loss.
Whenever the number of persons interposed between the original
buyers and the target population increases, filtering slows. In the
1970s and 1980s, a surge in the number of younger adults at mid-
dle-incomes all but eliminated filtering to the poor in many Ameri-
can cities. 96 In such a situation, the Filter Rate (f) equals zero and
Regime Three will always increase the supply of affordable homes.
Related is the phenomenon of "gentrification," where high den-
sity urban stock is renovated for use by the wealthy. 197 The filter
theory must assume that any housing trade will improve the stock
choices of the displaced. That bit of wishful thinking ignores the
probable inappropriateness of the gentry's prior residence in af-
fordable housing, and the effects of relative income on the ability
to bid for space. The latter point is critical in understanding Filter
Loss. The supply of physical housing services is limited by the fea-
sible number of sites. Different groups compete for these sites on
the basis of their relative incomes. As relative income disparities
between the rich and poor increase-as they did at an unprece-
dented rate during the 1980s-the total amount of space possessed
by the wealthy increases, while the total amount of space possessed
by the poor decreases. Gentrification represents the worst symp-
tom of this phenomenon. Often, the gentry have multiple resi-
dences; almost always they live with a much smaller number of
occupants per room than the residents whom they displace-con-
sistent with the current trends of early move-out from the parents'
home, late marriage, and few children. 19
The sum of all these factors is the chance that a move in the filter
chain will not occur. The total Filter Loss for a new development
can be found by multiplying this chance by the number of moves
needed for the benefit of the new stock to reach the target popula-
196. See Reassessing Rent Control, supra note 52, at 1836-37; see generally Aoki,
supra note 25; Merrill & Lincoln, supra note 7.
197. See Reassessing Rent Control, supra note 52, at 1835-41 (gentrification
removes stock from the affordable housing market without providing replacement
units). The relative buying power of the "gentry"-who often bid to own multi-family
buildings-is reinforced by federal tax policy. See Kenneth K. Baar, Guidelines for
Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons for a Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 837
(1983) (the value of a condominium is often double that of the same physical unit
used as a rental). See supra note 192 for the tax reasons behind the price discrepancy.
198. Reassessing Rent Control, supra note 52, at n.12, citing William Alonso, The
Population Factor and Urban Structure, in THE PROSPECrIVE CITY 32, 36-37 (Arthur
Solomon ed., 1981).
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tion. 199 The constituent elements of the Filter Loss are too com-
plex to predict actual numbers without: reference to a concrete
situation. But because time, some market segmentation, some in-
come disparity, and some transaction costs are unavoidable, the
rate of Filter Loss will always be greater than zero. 20 0 To the extent
that the Filter Loss is greater than zero, the building of a new unit
of housing for the wealthy will not benefit the poor as much as the
building of a new unit specifically for the target population.
Extremely high Filter Loss is more likely to be encountered in
certain kinds of markets-those with old stock, stock far away
from employment opportunities, barriers to mortgage financing,
"bad" neighborhoods, substantial income disparities, a risk of gen-
trification, or a general scarcity of buildable space. Where Filter
Loss is high, even a large drop in the production of market-priced
housing will have little deleterious effect on the welfare of the
poor.
d. Overall Supply Effects
It should now be clear that even Regime Three, the hypothetical
worst-case intervention, is likely to increase the stock of affordable
homes. It will increase the amount of affordable stock when
1) demand is inelastic and the developers' new ability to price
discriminate outweighs revenue losses (AP > 0);
2) factor exit is not a reasonable possibility (rqS A 0); or
3) the Filter Rate is low (f z 0).
Any of these conditions is sufficient-if even one exists, no further
analysis of Regime Three's efficacy is necessary.
If none of these three conditions exist, however, the advisability
of Regime Three in terms of affordable stock growth depends on
whether the loss in filtered-down market stock is bigger than the
set-aside (AP * ilS * f <?> Si). An increase in affordable stock is
also likely in markets with inelastic demand-or when the inter-
vention is regional-because the supply shift will be small. An in-
crease in affordable stock is likely in markets characterized by
199. The Mt. Laurel court applied similar logic. See Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d at 451-57
(rejecting defendant county's argument that filtering will produce needed affordable
housing on evidence of increasing suburban prices, increasing suburban demand, and
the risk of abandonment cycles).
200. Significant investment may cause a fixed number of old luxury units to be
turned into a greater number of higher-density affordable units. This does not mean,
however, that there has been Filter Gain, or that the Filter Loss is < 0. The new
investment itself is a supply increase. Filter Rate and Filter Loss are measures of the
effects of the old investment on its own terms and without additional money.
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many old buildings, racial or other filtering barriers, or demo-
graphic growth, because the Filter Rate will be low.
Therefore: the only markets in which Regime Three willnot in-
crease the housing stock are those with all three of the following:
(1) low Filter Loss; (2) elastic consumer demand; and (3) elastic
supply of land (a danger of factor exit). Even when they are pres-
ent, to the extent that a regional intervention makes demand in-
elastic, a regional intervention will increase the affordable stock.2 1
Any intervention which occurs in the face of an inelastic demand
curve, including any regional intervention, does risk encouraging
gentrification. As the price of new housing increases, the wealthy
will turn to the old stock-renovating and possibly displacing it.
This effect may or may not be serious, depending on the costs of
converting the existing stock to "gentry" uses. It will never offset
the full benefit of Regime Three on the stock of affordable housing
because some conversion costs always exist (one must remember
that the demand curve was inelastic). To the extent conversion
costs are not sufficient to meet a region's agenda to stop gentrifica-
tion, there are two options: set legal barriers to gentrification (rent
control on the old stock is a solution which has additional positive
supply effects in gentrifying markets20 2); or keep the Regime Three
price effect as small as possible.
2. Winners and Losers Under Regime Three
a. Existing Homeowners
Existing homeowners have reason to be ambivalent toward Re-
gime Three-but they will like it more than Regime TWo. The
drop in the Exclusivity Premium may be less. The loss of the pres-
tige/prejudice component may be smaller because part of the ear-
lier loss was a reaction to increased density, not merely the new
inhabitants. The loss of the tax component may be smaller because
201. Regional demand is less elastic because consumers can no longer shop for
favorable deals between jurisdictions. It is still elastic to the extent that buyers substi-
tute old stock for new construction, or substitute other purchases for housing when
the price of housing increases. The critical, exogenous variable then becomes the
price elasticity of regional demand for housing services among the wealthy. Current
research methods can determine this number with reasonable accuracy.
202. Only the most closed-minded observer could read Reassessing Rent Control,
supra note 52, and still think that any economic theory dictates that rent control on
existing stock will harm the supply of affordable housing in a gentrifying market.
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Regime Three is unlikely to house as many poor persons (and
fewer poor persons need fewer services).2 °3
Even better for homeowners: the restriction in the supply of
market-price homes will tend to increase the resale value of ex-
isting residential property, at least in jurisdictions with somewhat
inelastic demand. Suburban homeowners who want to sell can
reap considerable profits. Ellickson goes so far as to claim that the
desire of local homeowners to capture this additional resale value
motivates most inclusionary zoning reform in California.20 4 This
claim is dubious because the loss in Exclusivity Premium (espe-
cially in the wealthy suburbs about which Ellickson writes) will
usually be greater than gains in resale price caused by the restric-
tion in competing supply. Furthermore, homeowners who do not
sell do not benefit at all from inclusionary zoning. To the extent
Ellickson is correct, however, proponents of affordable housing
have a strange and valuable ally.
b. Owners of Undeveloped Suburban Land
Landowners are clearly losers under Regime Three. In markets
not characterized by perfectly inelastic demand curves or by exces-
sive developer profits, the owners of undeveloped suburban land
will see a drop in the value of their property. This decrease will be
greater per inclusionary unit than it was under Regime Two, be-
cause there is no density bonus to mitigate losses.
c. Buyers of Non-Inclusionary Units
Those who buy non-inclusionary units in jurisdictions with some-
what inelastic demand curves will inevitably pay higher prices for
new and used homes. The price increase will reflect both a propor-
tion of the costs of the inclusionary units, and whatever cartel prof-
its developers can wring out of the restriction in supply. If demand
is elastic, the effect on buyers is the same as under Regime Two: as
a group they break even, but the ones who value the Exclusivity
Premium more than the average buyer suffer a decrease in welfare.
203. If Regime Three builds the same number of affordable units as Regime Two,
then the loss of the tax component of the Exclusivity Premium caused by Regime
Three may be greater. Services may cost more because of sprawl. FISCHEL, supra
note 7, at 268 (provision of utilities and schools costs more when density is low).
204. "Viewed most cynically, inclusionary zoning appears to be a clever double tax
on new construction that existing homeowners and landlords have devised largely in
order to augment their own wealth." Irony, supra note 5, at 1203.
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d. Recipients of Inclusionary Units
Consumers who receive inclusionary units still benefit. The en-
joyment of this benefit may be inefficient under the typical tests.
The amount of inefficient welfare gain will increase because the
inclusionary units are bigger.
e. Other Low Income Buyers
The welfare of the low income residents who seek homes in
other jurisdictions depends on the direction of the affordable stock
change. Ellickson is wrong when he writes that "the members of
the eligible class who do not receive units are hurt by the program"
whenever the "inclusionary government faces a downward sloping
[elastic] demand curve. ' 20 5 A downwardly sloping demand curve
means inelastic demand, and the corresponding ability of develop-
ers to capture extra revenue from state-enforced price discrimina-
tion. Furthermore, regardless of the slope of the demand curve,
housing consumers cannot be hurt to the extent that additional
costs are passed on to the owners of underdeveloped land.
If quantity does not change, and to a lesser extent, even if it
does, low income housing consumers may still benefit from Regime
Three. The fact that low income persons are moving into the new
units suggests less Filter Loss. If the inclusionary program contains
resale restrictions, limiting the new units to residents in the target
class, the Filter Loss approaches a perfect 0.
f. Public Administrative Costs
In all important respects, the administrative costs of Regime
Three are identical to those of Regime Two.
3. Effects of Regime Three: Running Summary
Local Regime Three interventions can increase the stock of af-
fordable housing in all jurisdictions with high Filter Loss, inelastic
demand among market-rate buyers, or very inelastic supply of
land. Regional interventions, to the extent that they face a more
inelastic demand curve, are likely to be more successful (although
they must be careful to avoid gentrification). Regime Three also
effects a substantial income transfer from wealthy consumers to
poorer ones. Sometimes that wealth transfer will benefit only
those who actually receive the inclusionary units. Unless develop-
ment is slowed considerably, however, the wealth transfer will usu-
205. Id.
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ally benefit even those low income housing consumers who do not
receive inclusionary units directly. Their new wealth is "taken"
from, in decreasing order of probable incidence: landowners,
wealthy home buyers, and developers.
Although Regime Three fares well against the status quo or even
a free market, it will almost always be worse than Regime Two.
Like Regime Three, Regime TWo allows developers to price dis-
criminate against a sloping demand curve and capture additional
revenue. However, developers under Regime Two also benefit
from the cost savings that come with higher density construction.
The additional per unit savings will make affordable housing con-
struction more profitable than under Regime Three-either in-
creasing revenue more or setting off a greater proportion of the
inclusionary losses (depending on the nature of demand). Regime
Two also changes the physical characteristics of the housing stock
in ways that lower Filter Loss and allow a more efficient mix of
construction inputs than under Regime Three.
If Regime Three has advantages vis-a-vis the other Regimes,
these advantages are political, rather than economic. Regime
Three may curtail new construction that competes with the existing
stock. Regime Two can do that as well. But Regime Two also cre-
ates cost savings from higher density and efficient use of inputs-
meaning a greater number of new units. Obviously, more units is
good from the standpoint of housing policy. But more units, espe-
cially more affordable units, will endanger the Exclusivity Premium
and intensify political opposition from existing home owners. Re-
gime Three, on the other hand, limits construction and makes sure
that inclusionary units fit exclusionary density patterns. The loss of
Exclusivity Premium is smaller, and the increase in cartel rent is
not offset to the same degree. Ellickson saw this welfare gain and
rejected inclusionary zoning as harmful. The irony of Irony is that
the promise of cartel rent may speed beneficial reforms.0 6
206. Note that the political advantages of Regime Three decrease as the political
power of developers grows. The choice between Regime Two and Regime Three
therefore represents a struggle between two coalitions: homeowners and inclusionary
consumers versus developers and wealthy consumers. Also note that, from an econo-
mist's perspective, the need to rely on elements of Regime Three, still an improve-
ment over the status quo, is unfortunate, because the other two regimes are better
able to increase the supply of affordable homes.
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IV. Conclusion
This Article offers no detailed advice on how to implement any
of the three regimes. Nevertheless, an important point follows nat-
urally from the discussion above. The choice between the pure
builder's remedy and an inclusionary program with set-asides de-
pends upon the buying power of the target population. If the tar-
get population has adequate income, or the government is ready to
provide some form of subsidy, a builder's remedy may be best.
Builders will naturally respond to the demand for affordable con-
struction and self-enforce the inclusionary rules. Housing stock
will increase. The market will function more efficiently, unless so
many remedies are awarded that stock and efficiency gains are out-
weighed by legitimate regional externalities. There will be no pub-
lic costs besides those necessary to hear appeals.
If the buying power of the target population is low, a builder's
remedy may not make much difference, absent scarce government
subsidies. One point of this Article is that such subsidies are un-
necessary for successful housing reform in jurisdictions where mar-
ket inefficiencies created by exclusionary zoning can be converted
into de facto subsidization by inclusionary zoning. Set-aside pro-
grams (voluntary or mandatory) that trade density variances for
set-aside obligations can help solve the problem of the buying
power of the poor.
The choice between voluntary and mandatory programs is also a
function of how much buying power a particular jurisdiction wants
to distribute to the poor. If the target population needs only a
shallow subsidy (or if a deep subsidy can be provided without los-
ing developer enthusiasm), then a voluntary regime is probably an
acceptable solution. In areas where a greater transfer of neighbor-
hood wealth is necessary to promote affordable housing, zoning
rules should be mandatory. In the latter case, below-cost construc-
tion will be paid for primarily by homeowners and owners of devel-
opable land.
In some situations, the needs of the target population may be so
great that inclusionary zoning cannot provide enough affordable
homes without reducing the profitability of luxury residential con-
struction. Local authorities should be cautious in such situations.
It would still be wrong, however, to reject inclusionary programs as
harmful to the poor. -Even inclusionary programs that threaten
builders' profits change the nature of the housing stock, increase
the Filter Rate, distribute the regional tax base more evenly, lessen
price pressure in existing urban communities, and increase the mo-
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bility, opportunities, and wealth of the American poor. The policy
debate about inclusionary zoning-which involves many more is-
sues than the economic consequences set forth above-should
move forward with this in mind.
